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Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Arciiive 

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http://www.archive.org/details/essaysixxxOOsearrich 


THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 


THE 

MAGIC  o/EXPERIENCE 

A  CONTRIBUTION 
TO  THE  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

BY 

H.  STANLEY  REDGROVE 

B.Sc.  (Lond.),  F.C.S. 


WITH  AN   INTRODUCTION 

BY 

SIR   W.    F.    BARRETT,    F.R.S. 


1915  •  J.  M.  DENT  &  SONS  LTD. 

LONDON        AND        TORONTO 
NEW   YORK:    E.    P.    DUTTON    y    CO. 


tH6tMiD 


e 


This  Book  is  humbly  dedicated  to 

THE  Memory  of  the  Great  Men 

WHOSE  Experience  and  Thought, 

AS  embodied  in  their  Works, 

have  made  the  Writing  of  it  possible. 


331721 


Enter  into  His  gates  with  thanksgiving. 

And  into  His  courts  with  praise  : 

Give  thanks  unto  Him,  and  bless  His  name. 

Psalm  c.  4. 

\       Truth  can  never  be  told  so  as  to  be  understood,  and  not  be 
believ'd. — ^William  Blake  :  The  Marriage  of  Heaven  and  Hell, 


PREFACE 

It  is  sometimes  said  that,  whereas  Science  pro- 
gresses, Philosophy  is  stagnant.  I  beheve  that 
this  is  profoundly  false  ;  but  there  is  this  fragment 
of  truth  in  the  assertion : — Science  is  concerned 
with  problems  which  are  not  ultimate — the  ques- 
tions she  sets  herself  to  answer  are  questions 
concerning  the  correlation  of  phenomena,  not 
^  concerning  their  Source  or  ultimate  significance — 
hence  Science  is  continually  solving  her  problems  : 
but  no  sooner  has  she  solved  one  than,  as  in  the 

^case  of  the  heads  of  the  hydra-headed  monster  of 
legend,  another  rises  to  take  its  place.  Philosophy, 
on  the  other  hand,  never  solves  her  problems,  just 

'*^  because  they  are  ultimate  problems.    But  this  is 

by  no  means  to  say  that  she  is  stagnant  and  never 

progresses,  because  she  is  continually  approaching, 

though  she  may  never  gain,  the  final  answer  to  her 

questioning.    I  do  not  think  it  unhkely  that,  had 

I  lived  in  the  days  of  Plato,  I  should  have  written 

a  book  on  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  discussed 

some  of  the  questions  I  am  concerned  with  here  ; 

but  I  do  not  think  that  it  would  have  been  as  good, 

i.€.,  as  adequate,  a  book  as  this.    Or,  if  this  sounds 

conceited,  let  mc  say  that  I  think  that  it  would 

vii 


via      THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 

have  been  a  worse,  Le*,  a  less  adequate,  book  than 
this»  The  sentiment,  at  least,  is  not  one  of  con- 
ceit* What  I  really  want  to  express  is  my  feeling 
of  indebtedness  to  the  past ;  my  consciousness 
that  Philosophy  has  progressed,  and  that  by  having 
^  been  born  late  in  the  nineteenth  century,  I  have 
profited  by  this  progression. 

The  chief  sources  of  my  indebtedness  may  be 
gathered  from  the  book  itself,  but  a  few  names  may, 
perhaps,  be  specified  here.  And  I  would  mention 
Descartes  first,  because,  as  I  think,  he  teaches  that 
doubt  which  is  the  beginning  of  wisdom.  It  is 
necessary,  so  it  seems  to  me,  to  disbeheve  rightly 
^  before  one  can  beheve  rightly,  —  to  cast  out 
.  opinions  based  on  authority,  convention,  or  mere 
hearsay,  before  clear  knowledge  is  possible.  And 
-  then  I  would  name  Berkeley  and  Mill,^  because 
they  completed  the  work  of  Descartes  ;  it  is  they 
who  tell  us  to  believe  the  clear  evidence  of  our 
senses — of  our  consciousness  —  in  preference  to 
the  speculative  hypotheses  of  materialistic  and 
deterministic  philosophers.  But  were  we  to  rest 
here,  we  should  leave  a  whole  world  of  experience 
uninvestigated.  We  must  turn  to  the  mystics* 
to  complete  the  work  of  the  idealists.    It  is,  per- 

*  To  avoid  misunderstanding,  let  mc  at  once  say  that  I  differ 
from  Mill  on  many  very  important  points. 

•  **  Mysticism  *'  is  a  very  ambiguous  word  :    I  attempt  to 
define  it  in  the  course  of  the  book* 


PREFACE  ix 

haps,  difl&cult  to  select  names  for  special  mention, 
but  I  think  they  must  be,  as  concerns  my  own  in- 
debtedness, those  of  Jacob  Boehme  ;  John  Smith, 
the  Cambridge  Platonist ;  and,  most  assuredly, 
the  great  Swedish  scientist-philosopher-theologian, 
Emanuel  Swedenborg,  whose  illuminating  works 
deserve  to  be  valued  by  contemporary  philo- 
sophical thought  to  a  greater  extent  than  is  the 
case. 

I  do  not  want  here  to  enter  upon  a  discussion  of 
the  question  of  the  necessity  of  technical  terms  to 
Philosophy.  But  I  would  say  that  I  have  endeav- 
oured to  avoid  all  undue  technicalities  in  this  book, 
and  I  believe  that  the  ordinary  reader,  to  whom  the 
average  work  on  academic  philosophy  is  as  intel- 
ligible as  Elliptic  Functions  or  Chinese,  will  find 
it,  if  not  exactly  hght  literature,  at  least  quite 
easily  understandable.  It  is  not,  however,  I  hope, 
a  **  popular  **  book,  in  the  sense  in  which  that 
word  implies  inaccuracy  and  superficiahty  of 
treatment. 

There  are  some  people  who  are  never  happy 
imless  they  can  attach  a  label  to  everything.  They 
seem,  and  this  is  the  worst  of  it,  to  imagine  that 
this  labelling  can  take  the  place  of  adequate 
criticism ;  and  they  dismiss  this  and  that  contribu- 
tion to  Philosophy  with  a  shrug  of  the  shoulders, 
and  the  airy  remark  that  it  is  only  Pantheism  or 


X         THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 

Hylozoism  or  some  other  *'  ism/'  If  my  own 
views  must  be  labelled,  then  I  would  prefer  the  label 
to  be  one  of  my  own  choosing,  and  I  do  not  think 
that  I  can  choose  a  better  one  than  **  Idealistic  or 
Rational  Empiricism/*  I  use  the  term  '*  empiri- 
cism/' because  I  believe  that  no  true  knowledge  is 
attainable  apart  from  experience  ♦  I  use  the  term 
**  rational/'  because  I  believe  that  bare  experience 
is  not  sufficient  for  this  end  :  experience  must  be 
'  interpreted  by  reason*  Experience,  I  believe,  is 
the  obverse  of  a  coin  of  which  the  reverse  is  revela- 
tion :  inductive  reasoning  is,  in  a  sense,  a  magic 
ritual  whereby  fuller  or  higher  revelation  becomes 
possible  :  but  the  data  of  experience  are  the  sym- 
bolic elements  of  this  ritual,  without  which  it 
cannot  be  performed  or  its  products  obtained. 
Finally,  I  use  the  term  **  idealistic,"  because  I 
believe  that  all  knowledge  is  knowledge  of  ideas,  of 
\  the  relations  between  ideas,  and  of  minds  wherein 
^  ideas  exist.  For  me,  **  ideality  "  and  **  tmreality  " 
are  antonyms,  not  synonyms.  I  hold  that  Spirit 
is  the  One  Substance  of  the  Universe,  all  of 
whose  phenomena  are,  therefore,  spiritual  pheno- 
,  mena,  Le.,  changes  of  one  sort  or  another  in 
ideas.  This  last  sentence  may  sound  like  a  con- 
fession of  ontological  rather  than  epistemological 
faith ;  but  it  is  neither  possible  nor  desirable  to 
draw  too  hard  and  fast  a  line  of  demarcation 


PREFACE  » 

between   Ontology,   the   science   of  being,   and 
Epistemology,  the  science  of  knowledge. 

Having  acknowledged,  though  inadequately,  my 
debt  to  the  past;,  I  would,  in  conclusion,  express 
my  gratitude  to  those  of  the  present  who  in  one 
way  or  another  have  facilitated  the  production  of 
this  book.  And  firstly,  I  must  express  my  in- 
debtedness to  Sir  W,  F.  Barrett,  F.R.S.,  not  only 
for  having  written  so  excellent  an  Introduction  to 
the  book,  but  also  for  having  read  it  in  typescript 
and  made  several  useful  suggestions,  the  majority 
of  which  I  have  been  able  to  carry  out.  I  have  to 
express  my  thanks  to  the  Editors  of  The  Occult 
Review,  The  Quest,  and  The  New-Church  Magazine 
for  having  allowed  me  to  incorporate  in  this  book 
material  afforded  by  three  of  my  essays  published, 
one  in  each  of  their  journals,  under  the  titles, 
*'  The  Idealistic  Point  of  View,'*  **  The  Sight  of 
the  Soul,''  and  *'  The  Criteria  of  Truth/'  I  have 
further  to  offer  my  hearty  thanks  to  Miss  L  M.  L, 
Cowen  for  valuable  assistance  in  preparing  the 
typescript  for  the  press  and  in  reading  the  proof- 
sheets,  to  Mr.  H.  F.  Trobridge  for  a  number  of 
useful  criticisms  and  suggestions,  and  to  Mr, 
Sijil  Abdul-Ali  for  having  read  the  proofs. 

ri*  S«  iv* 

The  Polytechnic, 
Regent  Street,  W. 
May,  1914. 


CONTENTS 


Preface    •••«•••• 
Introduction  by  Sir  William  F,  Barrett,  F,RJS. 


PAGE 

vii 

X 


PART  I 

_  IDEALISM 

SBC* 

1.  The  Subjectivity  of  Experience 

2.  General  Analysis  of  Experience 

3.  On  the  Differences  between  Sense-Impressions  and 

Mental  Images      .         *        ,        • 

4.  (i.)  Differences  in  Vividness 

5.  (ii,)  Differences  in  our  Control 

6.  These  the  only  Differences  given  in  Experience 

7.  Matter  as  a  Phenomenon 

8.  Matter  as  a  Substance 

9.  Criticism  of  Materialism        .         *         . 
10*  Matter  as  a  Substance  Unknowable 

11.  Subjective  Reality         ♦        ♦        •        . 

12.  The  Laws  of  Nature  Universally  Valid     • 

13.  The  Laws  of  Nature  not  Necessary 

14.  The  Existence  of  a  Universal  Mind 

15.  Externality  and  Will      .... 

16.  Fallacy  of  **  Christian  Science  *'  Metaphysics 

17.  Objective  Reality  .... 

18.  Nature  as  Divine  Externality 

19.  Existence  of  God  more  Sure  than  that  of  other  Men 

20.  Spiritual  Reality  ..... 

21.  The  Significance  of  Telepathy 

22.  Ideas :  Spiritual  and  Natural 

23.  What  is  Mysticism  ?■.... 

24.  Mysticism  as  a  Mode  of  Life 

laii 


13 
13 

15 
16 
16 
18 
19 
ai 
33 
24 
35 
26 
ag 
30 
31 
3a 
34 
34 
36 
38 
40 
41 
43 


xiv       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 


PART  II 


SEC* 

a5« 

27. 
28, 
29^ 
30, 
31, 
32, 
33' 
34« 
35. 
36. 

37« 
38. 

39- 
40. 
41* 
42. 

43* 
44. 

45- 


MYSTICISM 

The  Mystic  Quest 

The  Rationality  of  Mysticism 

Views  of  the  "  Cambridge  Platonists  ** 

The  Nature  of  Intuition 

Intuition  and  Art 

Visions  and  The  Vision 

Visions  Nonessential  to  Mysticism 

Subjective  and  Objective  Visions     . 

Relativity  of  Natural  Experience 

Relativity  of  Spiritual  Experience    ♦ 

The  Emotional  Temperament 

Causation  and  the  Metaphysics  of  Source 

Asceticism  and  its  Dangers     . 

The  Subconscious  Self  and  its  Products 

Conclusions  as  to  the  Value  of  Visions 

The  Testimony  of  Jacob  Boehme    . 

Discussion  of  Boehme*s  Seership     ♦ 

The  Testimony  of  Emanuel  Swedenborg 

Empiricism  and  Rationalism 

Superstition,  Science,  and  Philosophy  as  Forms  of 

Empiricism  ...         * 
Mysticism  as  Religious  Empiricism 


PAGB 

40 

50 

52 
56 

57 
58 
60 
62 
64 
65 
66 
67 
70 

71 
73 
73 
76 

77 
79 

80 
82 


PART  III 

THE  NATURE  AND  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH 

46.  Absolute  Truth  Unknowable  ....  85 

47.  Mathematical  Illustrations  :  (i.)  Convergent  Scries   .  86 

48.  Mathematical  Illustrations  :  (ii,)  Divergent  Scries     .  87 

49.  Mathematical  Illustrations  :  {iii,)  The  Hyperbola     .  89 

50.  All  Natural  Laws  Approximate       ....  90 

5 1 .  This  Statement  also  True  of  the  Laws  of  Mathematics  93 


CONTENTS  XV 

SEC.  PAGE 

53.  All  Knowledge  of  Truth  given  by  Inspiration  •        •  94 

53.  Induction 96 

54.  The  Bible  as  a  Source  of  Truth      .        .        •        .  97 

55.  Deduction 98 

56.  Faith  and  Sight 99 

57.  Swcdcnborg's  Attitude 100 

58.  The  Universality  of  Reason loi 

59.  The  True  Empiricism  and  the  False        .         .        .  103 

60.  Pragmatism          .......  104 

61.  The  Unity  of  Goodness  and  Truth         .        ♦        .  106 
6a.  Conclusion 108 


,.x) 


INTRODUCTION 

To  that  large  class  of  thoughtful  enquirers  who 
have  not  made  a  special  study  of  philosophy,  the 
accompanying  volume — to  which  the  author  has 
asked  me  to  write  a  few  words  of  Introduction, — 
will  be  found  a  useful  and  lucid  interpretation  of  the 
facts  of  experience  in  the  light  of  a  sane  idealism. 

The  first  concept  we  form  of  reality  is  that  de- 
rived from  our  sense-impressions,  and  the  world 
around  us  is  regarded  as  a  real  and  permanent 
existence  independent  of  mind.  Then  reason 
teaches  us  that  what  we  term  **  the  properties  of 
matter  **  are  known  to  us  only  as  sensations,  per- 
cepts of  our  minds,  and  that  we  really  know 
y  nothing  of  matter  in  itself,  that  is,  nothing  beyond 
the  properties  which  we  experience  as  sensations* 

How  different  our  concept  of  the  external  world 
would  be  if  we  were  deprived  of  some  of  those 
gateways  of  knowledge  —  the  senses  —  such,  for 
example,  as  sight  or  touch ;  and  again  how  different 
if  other  and  more  subtle  senses  —  profounder 
avenues  of  knowledge — were  given  to  us  I  Con- 
sider what  concept  of  matter  we  should  form  if 


a         THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 

wc  possessed  merely  the  sense  of  sight.     Every 

stimulus  given  to  the  optic  nerve,  whether  by 

.  pressure.,  electricity,  or  a  chemical  reagent,  would 

S'  he  sensed  only  as  a  flash  of  light,  and  we  should 
thereupon  infer  that  all  material  bodies,  all  pheno- 

\  mena,  were  simply  variations  in  luminosity,  and 
that  nothing  else  besides  these  had  any  real  exist- 
ence outside  ourselves*  So  also  if  we  were 
restricted  to  any  one  of  our  other  senses,  the  ex- 

^  ternal  world  in  each  case  would  excite  but  the 
single  idea  corresponding  to  that  sense.  Therefore 
all  we  can  assert  is  that  external  phenomena  arouse 
\  a  succession  of  mental  states,  and  our  present 
interpretation  of  those  states  may  be  only  a  little 
less  fallacious  than  the  erroneous  interpretation  we 
should  give  if  the  human  race  possessed  but  a 
single  sensory  organ. 

Our  ideas  of  the  world  without  us  accordingly 
contract  or  expand  in  proportion  to  the  extent  of 
the  means  by  which  that  world  is  perceived.  Now 
perception  is  impossible  without  a  mind  to  per- 
ceive, hence  Bishop  Berkeley  asserted  that  no 
object  can  exist  apart  from  mind.  Mind  is 
^^fc;,«ii.W^  certainly  the  deeper  reality,  and  nature  may  be 
""*^  merely  a  construction  of,  and  projection  from,  our 
own  minds ;  nor  can  we,  logically,  be  compelled 
to- admit  that  the  physical  world  exists  otherwise 
than  in  our  thought.    But  this  purely  subjective 


INTRODUCTION  3 

idealism,  or  solipsism,  was  not  Berkeley's  view* 
Solipsism  denies  the  existence  of  other  minds,  as 
well  as  the  physical  world,  except  as  ideas  in 
one's  own  mind,  and  as  it  maintains  that  one's 
own  thought  and  consciousness  alone  exist,  it  is 
pure  egoism,  Berkeley,  however,  maintains  that 
whilst  matter  has  no  independent  existence,  the 
permanence  of  the  physical  world  and  of  the  bws 
of  nature,  as  well  as  the  existence  of  minds  other 
than  our  own,  is  guaranteed  by  the  existence  of  a 
Universal  Mind.  Nature  and  ourselves  are,  from 
this  point  of  view,  the  appearance  or  vesture  of  the 
Divine  Idea — the  world  of  Divine  Thought,  which 
is  the  real  world ♦  Our  sensory  experiences  are, 
therefore,  not  imaginary,  but  are  caused  by  the 
will  of  the  Divine  Intelligence  ;  and  science  is  the 
attempt  to  decipher  the  divine  ideas  expressed  in 
nature,  so  far  as  our  limited  cognition  enables  us 
to  interpret  them. 

Hence  the  common  notion  of  Berkeley's  idealism 
is  seen  to  be  incorrect.  For  nature  does  not  exist 
only  in  the  thought  of  men,  nor  for  the  thought  of 
any  one  man,  nor  by  the  united  thoughts  of  all 
men,  but  it  exists  as  the  symbolical  expression  of 
the  Divine  thought,  and  is  perpetually  sustained 
by  the  Divine  Will. 

Against  this  view  is  the  difficulty  of  accounting 
for  the  independent  existence  and  activity  of  the 


4         THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 

conscious  self,  for  self-consciousness  cannot  be 
regarded  as  being  merely  a  succession  of  conscious 
states — the  self  is  not  an  idea,  not  an  object  of 
internal  observation.  Berkeley's  answer  is  that 
the  ego  is  one  of  a  world  of  free  and  independent 
spirits,  such  finite  minds  being  related  to  one 
another  and  to  the  Infinite  Mind  by  their  mutual 
interactions.  Bu:  even  so  the  difficulty  arises  of 
how  our  self-consciousness  regards  itself  as  finite 
and  how  the  notion  of  an  external  world  can  arise  in 
consciousness. 

iThe  idea  of  force  lying  behind  our  sensations 
gives  the  notion  of  externality  to  the  object  of  our 
perception.  This  idea  of  force  is  that  of  some 
resistance  encountered,  some  opposition  to  our  will, 
to  overcome  which  effort  is  needed.  But  the  ego 
itself  is  only  conscious  of  its  activity  when  that 
activity  is  opposed,  that  is,  when  effort  is  needed. 
Effort,  therefore,  lies  at  the  root  of  consciousness  ; 
an  effortless  action  arouses  no  consciousness  of 
the  act.  But  behind  the  sense  of  effort  in  the  ego 
lies  the  feeling  of  impulse  or  desire,  of  something 
to  attain.  Effort,  therefore,  implies  desire  and 
opposition  to  that  desire.  Moreover,  to  produce 
any  effort  requires  power,  that  is,  the  exertion  of 
force.  Hence,  consciousness,  in  so  far  as  it  is  the 
activity  of  the  ego,  is  force  striving  to  overcome 
force,  impelled  by  desire  or  affection ;    and  the 


INTRODUCTION  5 

notion  of  force  is  that  of  opposition  to  our  will 
from  our  contact  with  external  nature ♦ 

Whatever  view  we  take,  we  are,  therefore,  com- 
pelled to  admit  that  all  our  experience  of  pheno- 
mena is  due  to  some  form  of  action  from  without 
upon  our  own  minds.  The  materialist  says  that 
this  action  is  due  to  things  in  themselves,  to  a  self- 
existent  objective  world  :  the  idealist  says  that  this 
action  is  due  to  the  Divine  Mind  and  Will.  To 
the  materiahst,  the  stream  of  consciousness  within 
us  accompanies  the  brain-processes,  as  a  shadow 
accompanies  an  object :  mind  is  thus  regarded  as 
an  epiphenomenon  of  the  brain-processes,  and  as 
having  no  existence  apart  from  these  processes* 
To  the  idealist,  the  position  is  reversed :  matter  is, 
as  it  were,  the  shadow  thrown  by  thought,  and  has 
no  existence  apart  from  thought.  Another  school 
of  philosophy  regards  both  mind  and  matter  as 
equally  real,  but  as  having  no  causal  relation  to  each 
other;  matter  and  mind  are  supposed  to  ptursue 
parallel  paths  which  never  intersect.  Again, 
another  school,  like  that  of  Kant,  regards  matter 
and  mind  as  two  aspects  of  a  supreme  reality, 
which  is  unknown  to  us ; — mind  and  matter  being 
appearances  of  that  underlying  reality,  which  some, 
with  Spencer,  call  "The  Unknowable,**  others, 
with  Kant,  call  **  God.*'  The  laws  of  nature  reveal 
order  because  our  sense-impressions  are  partial 


6         THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 

manifestations  in  our  finite  minds  of  the  archetypes 
of  their  existence  in  the  Infinite  and  Supreme 
Order, 

That  this  ultimate  reality  is  Mind,  an  originating 
Divine  Mind — of  which  our  human  minds  give  us 
a  faint  adumbration — ^appears  unquestionable  from 
many  converging  reasons  and  streams  of  evidence. 
Take,  for  example,  the  intelligibility  and  continuity 
of  nature.  We  can  read  and  understand  the 
expression  of  human  thought  in  a  printed  page 
because  we  have  something  in  common  with  the 
writer  of  the  page,  and  that  something  is  mind* 
The  printed  words  do  not  enable  us  to  see  the 
author,  nor  do  they  remotely  resemble  him.  But 
the  printed  signs  are  intelligible  because  our  intel- 
ligence is  related  to  his  intelligence.  And  so  the 
mental  signs  which  the  phenomena  of  nature 
present  to  us  are  not  the  real  world,  for  the  world 
of  ontology,  the  world  of  Divine  Thought,  is  in- 
accessible to  us.  But  these  signs  reveal  order  and 
purpose  and  we  can  more  or  less  imperfectly 
interpret  those  signs,  because  they  arc  an  expression 
of  an  Intelligence  which  is  related  to  our  intelligence 
and  can  communicate  with  our  minds.  As  the 
processes  of  nature,  the  forms  and  wonder  of  life, 
reveal  intelHgence,  purpose,  and  will,  we  are  there- 
fore driven  to  conclude  that  the  ultimate  reahty 
lying  behind  nature  must  be  a  Supreme  Mind. 


INTRODUCTION  f 

As  I  have  said  elsewhere,  **  To  the  pure 
materialist  the  Universe  is  self-sustained  and  has  no 
deeper  meaning  than  the  appearance  it  presents 
to  our  senses ;  these  appearances  are  to  him  the 
ultimate  reality ♦^  He  sees  nature,  as  it  were  like 
the  curious  orderly  marks  on  a  printed  page,  but 
it  conveys  to  him — as  the  page  does  to  a  person  who 
cannot  read — no  deeper  meaning;  he  attributes 
the  order,  regularity,  and  continuity  of  the  printing 
to  the  interaction  of  the  black  marks  among  them- 
selves, a  chance  collocation  of  atoms*  Or  he  forms 
a  mechanical  theory  of  the  Universe  by  endowing 
atoms  with  some  occult  power,  and  conferring 
upon  them  the  very  properties  which  have  to  be 
explained/* ' 

In  an  admirable,  though  too  little  known,  paper 
on  **  The  Origin  of  Force,*'  which  Sir  John 
Herschel  published  some  fifty  years  ago,  he 
remarks — **  The  first  and  greatest  question  which 
Philosophy  has  to  resolve  in  its  attempts  to  make 
out  a  Cosmos  is  whether  we  can  derive  any  Hght 
from  our  internal  consciousness  of  thought,  reason, 
power,  will,  motive,  design — or  not :  whether,  that 

^Or  rather  he  postulates  a  material  self-existent  universe 
as  the  ultimate  reality^  a  universe  which  happens  to  excite 
sensation  and  experience. 

»  The  Contemporary  Review,  June  1914.  Sec  also  the  present 
writer's  Utile  book  on  Creative  Thought  and  the  Problem  of  Evil 
(Watkins^  19x4)* 


8         THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE 

is  to  say,  nature  is  or  is  not  more  interpretable  by 
supposing  these  things  (be  they  what  they  may) 
to  have  had,  or  to  have,  to  do  with  its  arrangements. 
Constituted  as  the  human  mind  is,  if  nature  be  not 
interpretable  through  these  conceptions,  it  is  not 
interpretable  at  all ;  and  the  only  reason  we  can 
have  for  troubling  ourselves  about  it  is  the  utili- 
tarian one  of  bettering  our  condition  by  *  subduing 
nature  *  to  our  use,  ♦  ♦  .  or  the  satisfaction  of  that 
sort  of  aimless  curiosity  which  can  find  its  gratifi- 
cation in  scrutinising  everything  and  compre- 
hending nothing*  But  if  these  attributes  of  mind 
are  not  consentaneous,  they  are  useless  in  the  way 
of  explanation.  Will  without  Motive,  Power  with- 
out Design,  Thought  opposed  to  Reason,  would 
be  admissible  in  explaining  a  chaos,  but  would 
render  little  aid  in  accounting  for  anything  else/*  * 
Philosophy  is  thus  the  re-thinking  of  experience. 
In  the  latter  part  of  this  volume,  the  author  shows 
that  whilst  truth  cannot  be  attained  apart  from 
experience,  there  are,  nevertheless,  forms  of  ex- 
perience which  transcend  our  recognised  sense- 
perceptions.  Telepathy  is  one  of  these :  and 
the  higher  intuitions  which  prophets,  poets,  and 
mystics  in  all  ages  have  had,  reveal  a  profounder 
world  than  that  of  **  sense  and  outward  things." 

'Sir  J.  W.   Herschel:    Lectures  on   Scientific   Subjects, 
P*  475* 


INTRODUCTION  9 

Life,  which,  to  the  eye  of  sense  alone,  breaks  itself 
up  into  a  multiplicity  of  forms,  and  individuals 
endowed  with  consciousness,  seemingly  a  collection 
of  independent  self-existing  facts,  is  by  intuition 
recognised  as  only  varied  modes  of  one  infinite  life^ 
We  are  seen  to  be  parts  of  a  larger  whole,  beings 
in  an  ideal  order*  Thus  we  are  led  to  realise  that 
that  which  is  of  highest  importance  in  each  indi- 
vidual life  is  the  recognition,  the  development,  and 
the  manifestation  of  the  divine  life  within* 

WILLIAM  F*  BARRETT* 


PARTI 
IDEALISM 


THE 
MAGIC   OF    EXPERIENCE 

PART  I 

IDEALISM 

§  1 .  All  experience  is  subjective,  ue.  exists  within  The  Sub- 
the  mind  of  the  individual  who  experiences.  But  Experience 
in  spite  of  the  self-evident  nature  of  this  fact,  its 
significance  does  not  seem  always  to  be  fully 
recognised ;  otherwise,  materialistic  theories  of 
the  Cosmos  would  be  propounded  with  a  less 
degree  of  assurance  than  is  actually  the  case.  For 
as  Berkeley  showed,  and  as  will  be  plain  in  the 
sequel,  the  fact  that  all  experience  is  subjective 
is  incompatible  with  materialism ;  unfortunately, 
however,  Berkeley  is  very  frequently  misunder- 
stood and  supposed  to  teach  that  experience  is 
unreliable,  an  idea  quite  alien  to  Ideahsm. 

§  2.  In  order  to  get  at  the  root  of  the  matter,  General 
let  us  attempt  an  analytical  examination  of  experi-  Expenwice 
ence  in  general,  ridding  ourselves  as  far  as  possible 
of  all   preconceptions   on   the  subject.     In   the 
first  place,  then,  we  may  distinguish  between  what 

13 


14      THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE     [§a 


are  respectively  termed  **  sense-impressions  **  or 
**  ideas  of  sensation  "  and  **  ideas  of  the  imagina- 
tion **  or  '*  mental  images/'  Thus,  at  the  present 
moment  I  am  experiencing  numerous  sensations, 

\  chiefly  visual  sensations  of  colour,  which  go  to 
make  up  my  study  in  which  I  am  writing  and  the 
various  objects  it  contains.  If  I  care  to  shut  my 
eyes,  however,  I  can  at  once  transport  myself  into 
entirely  different  surroundings  ;  but  what  I  then 

\  experience  are  images  created  by  my  imagination, 
not  sensations.    The  feelings  or  emotions  arising 

"^  on  account  of  sense-impressions  and  mental  images 
may  be  grouped  together  as  a  third  element  of 
experience.  And,  as  a  fourth  element,  may  be 
grouped  together  all  those  experiences,  e.g.,  visions, 
intuitions,  etc.,  which  are  termed  **  spiritual,*'  in 
contradistinction  from  the  other  three  '*  natural  " 
elements.  The  existence  of  the  first  three  elements 
of  experience  no  one  denies,  but  the  same  cannot  be 
said  of  this  alleged  fourth  element.  I  shall  deal 
with  this  question  more  especially  in  Part  II. 
With  the  third  element  in  experience  specified 
-  above  (feelings  and  emotions)  I  am  not  concerned 
in  this  book,  except  in  so  far  as  this  tends  to  become 
identified  with  the  fourth  element  (visions  and 
intuitions).  What  I  am  immediately  concerned 
with  is  the  distinction  between  the  first  two  ele- 
ments (sensations  and  mental  images). 


$3]  IDEALISM  15 

§  3.  In  common  opinion  and  according  to  the  On  the  dif- 
terms  of  materialistic  philosophy,  sensations  and  tween  Sense 
mental  images  differ  from  each  other  inasmuch  ^^P{^|^*J2f 
as  sensations  arise  on  account  of  a  material  world  Images 
external  to  us,  with  which  they  are  immediately 
connected,  whilst  mental  images  do  not  so  arise, 
and   have   no   immediate   connection   with   this 
material  world  ♦    Thus,  I  have  a  visual  sensation 
of  red  at  the  present  moment,  because  there  happens 
to  be  a  red-coloured  book,  a  material  book,  existing 
in  the  material  world  outside  of  me  in  the  line  of 
my  vision,  but  I  cannot  have  at  the  moment  a 
similar  sensation  of  purple,  because  a  purple- 
coloured  object,  with  which  I  can  put  my  eyes  in  a 
similar  relation,  is  not  handy*    I  must,  therefore, 
be  content  with  a  mental  image  of  purple,  which  I 
can  obtain  without  the  aid  of  the  material  world, 
except,  of  course,  that  part  of  it  I  call  *'  my  brain/* 
A  moment's  consideration,  however,  shows  us  that 
this  is  not  a  statement  of  the  differences  between 
sensations  and  mental  images  as  experienced — the 
differences,  ue,,  in  virtue  of  which  we  are  entitled 
to  divide  our  experiences  into  these  two  categories, 
and  in  virtue  of  which  we  can  determine  to  which 
category  any  one  of  our  experiences  belongs.     It 
is  not  this,  but  a  hypothesis  to  explain  such  differ- 
ences assumed  existent.    It  may  be  a  valid  hypo- 
thesis ;  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  not.    Let  us, 


i6       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE      [§3 

however,  attempt  a  statement  of  these  differences 
without  involving  ourselves  in  any  hypotheses 
whatever — then,  and  not  until  then,  when  we 
know  the  differences  that  need  explaining,  shall 
we  be  in  a  position  to  suggest  a  hypothesis  in 
explanation  of  these  differences^ 

tncS^^^'  §4.  An  examination  of  one's  own  experience 
Vividness  reveals  two  differences  between  those  forms  of 
experience  termed  respectively  **  sense-impres- 
sions **  and  **  mental  images/*  In  the  first  place, 
sense-impressions  are  generally  very  vivid  com- 
pared with  mental  images*  This  difference,  how- 
ever, is  a  purely  relative  one.  Sensations  which 
are  not  attended  to  and  barely  penetrate  the  fringe 
of  consciousness  can  hardly  be  called  vivid  ;  whilst 
in  dreams,  on  the  other  hand,  whatever  may  be 
the  cause,  the  dramatic  images  in  our  imaginations 
take  on  an  apparent  vividness  comparable  only 
with  the  sense-impressions  of  our  daily  life.^ 

{ii,)  Differ-        §  5.  The  second  and  more  fundamental  dis- 

Comro?°"'   tinction  between  sense-impressions  and  ideas  of 

the  imagination  is  to  be  found  in  the  degree  of 

control  we  have  over  them.     If  I  desire  to  do  so, 

*  The  reason  may  be  that  lacking  any  sense-impressions  with 
which  to  compare  them,  the  images  of  our  dreams  appear  far 
more  vivid  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case. 


§5]  IDEALISM  17 

merely  by  an  effort  of  will  I  can  conjure  up  in  my 
mind  a  complete  mental  image  of  an  orange,  Le,, 
not  merely  a  visual  image  of  an  orange,  but  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  sense-impressions  connoted  by 
the  term,  such  as  the  characteristic  taste,  odour, 
etc.  But  in  order  to  experience  the  correspond- 
ing sense-impressions,  I  must  first  of  all  experience 
certain  other  sense-impressions  —  such  complex 
series  of  sensations  I  call  **  going  to  the  fruiterer's 
and  buying  an  orange,*'  or  **  instructing  some  one 
to  procure  me  an  orange,*'  etc, — and  it  is,  of  course, 
quite  possible  that  in  any  given  case  I  may  not  be 
able  to  obtain  the  desired  sense-impression  how- 
ever much  I  may  strive  so  to  do. 

Sense-impressions  always  occur  in  certain 
groups  and  follow  definite  and  fixed  orders.  Thus, 
the  characteristic  gustatory  and  odoriferous  sensa- 
tions connoted  by  the  term  **  orange  "  are  always 
accompanied  by  such  sensations  as  those  of  round- 
ness, smoothness,  yellowness,  etc.  Or  to  take 
another  example  :  the  complex  series  of  sense- 
impressions  called  **  putting  one's  hand  in  the 
fire  "  is  invariably  followed  by  an  intense  sensa- 
tion of  pain.  These  orders  in  the  groupings  and 
sequences  of  sense-impressions  constitute  what  are 
called  **  the  laws  of  Nature,"  and  our  control  of  our 
sense-impressions  is  strictly  limited  thereby.  It 
is  quite  easy  to  call  up  in  the  mind  representations 

B 


i8       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE      [§5 

of  all  the  other  sense-impressions  connoted  by  the 
term  **  orange/*  substituting,  however,  an  idea  of 
pinkness  in  place  of  yellowness,  or  squareness  in 
place  of  roundness ;  but  similar  groupings  of 
sense-impressions  themselves  have  never  been 
experienced*^  Or  to  take  another  example  :  it  is 
quite  easy  to  picture  in  one*s  mind  the  process  of 
putting  one's  hand  in  the  fire,  without  at  all  pro- 
ceeding to  conjure  up  a  representation  of  the  very 
painful  sensations  which  inevitably  follow  the 
corresponding  sequence  of  sense-impressions* 

These  the  §  6,  Now,  it  is  of  the  very  utmost  importance  to 

ferenccs  notice  that  these  two  differences  are  the  only  differ- 
Experience  ^^ces  between  sense-impressions  and  mental 
images  of  which  we  have  any  consciousness,  and 
it  is  wholly  in  virtue  of  these  that  we  divide  our 
experiences  into  the  two  groups  we  call  respec- 
tively **  sense-impressions  ''  and  **  mental  images,*' 
and  decide  to  which  group  any  particular  state  of 
consciousness  is  to  be  assigned*  In  everyday  life, 
we  have,  as  a  rule,  no  difficulty  in  deciding  this 
question  ;  for,  usually,  our  sense-impressions  are 
very  vivid,  whilst  our  mental  images  are  very 
vague,  compared  one  with  the  other*    And  in  any 

*  It  is  true,  of  course,  that  it  might  be  possible  to  make  an 
artificial  orange  to  conform  to  the  required  conditions,  but  this 
does  not  really  alter  the  argument. 


§7]  IDEALISM  19 

case  of  doubt,  the  method  adopted  to  decide  the 
question  always  depends,  in  the  last  analysis,  on 
the  difference  in  our  power  of  control  over  these 
two  forms  of  experience.  In  dreams,  however, 
the  spurious  vividness  of  the  dramatic  play  of 
mental  images  deceives  us — we  mistake  them  for 
sense-impressions — and  it  seems  that  in  dreams 
our  nearly  absolute  power  of  controlling  the  ideas 
of  the  imagination  is  dormant,  though  it  appears 
that  some  persons  ^  are  dimly  conscious,occasionally, 
of  a  power  to  control  their  dreams  to  some  slight 
extent.  But,  at  any  rate,  the  irregular  order  in 
which  our  dream-ideas  succeed  one  another  serves 
to  distinguish  them  from  sense-impressions,  which, 
as  remarked  above,  always  occur  in  definite  and 
fixed  sequences. 

§  7.  As  I  have  already  indicated,  the  usual  Matter  as  a 
explanation  of  the  differences  between  those  forms  ^^^^^^^^ 
of  experience  called  respectively  "  sense-impres- 
sions **  and  **  ideas  of  the  imagination  '*  is  that  the 
former  arise  on  account  of  an  objective  world  of 
matter  external  to  us,  with  which  they  are  in 
intimate  relation,  whereas  the  latter  bear  no  direct 
relation  to  this  world.     It  is  necessary,  however, 

•The  present  writer  has  experienced  this  on  two  or  three 
occasions.  C/.  Dr.  Frederik  van  Eeden:  "A  Study  of 
Dreams  *'  {Proceedings  of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research, 
July  1913,  vol.  xxvi.,  pp.  431  et  seq.). 


20       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE      [§7 

to  distinguish  between  two  different  uses  of  tJbc 
word  '*  matter/*  or  rather  *'  material  body/'  When 
an  ordinary  person,  who  has  not  been  sophisticated 
by  the  tenets  of  materiahstic  philosophy,  speaks  of 
a  **  material  body/*  say  an  apple,  what  he  means  is 
a  body  that  has  a  certain  si^e,  shape,  hardness, 
colour,  taste,  smell,  etc*  Now,  evidently  there  can 
be  no  doubt  as  to  the  existence  of  such  bodies, 
since  they  consist  of  complexes  of  ideas  of  sensation, 
and  when  we  speak  of  the  existence  of  a  sensation 
what  we  mean  is  that  it  is  perceived.  The  only 
point  is  that  it  is  hardly  correct  to  speak  of  a  body 
which  possesses  shape,  size,  hardness,  colour,  etc. 
(unless  the  reference  is  to  a  mind  in  which  these 
sense-impressions  exist,  Le.,  a  mind  which  perceives 
them) ;  it  would  be  more  accurate  to  speak  of  a 
body  which  is  this  shape,  si2;e,  hardness,  colour,  etc. 
A  similar  sense  of  the  word  **  matter,**  moreover, 
seems  to  be  the  only  legitimate  one  with  which  it 
may  be  employed  in  science — r.e.,  as  connoting 
the  fact  or  natural  law  that  sense-impressions 
always  occur  in  definite  groups,  the  name  **  material 
body  **  being  given  to  any  such  group — since, 
strictly  speaking,  science  is  only  concerned  with 
facts  of  experience  as  such,  the  orders  in  which 
they  occur  and  the  relations  they  bear  to  one 
another ;  not  with  the  sources  or  causes  of  experi- 
ence.   Professor  Ostwald,  however,  who  is  perhaps 


§8]  IDEALISM  21 

the  greatest  living  authority  on  physical  chemistry, 
questions  whether  the  term  **  matter  **  ought  not 
to  be  deleted  from  scientific  terminology.  He 
says  in  his  Fundamental  Principles  of  Chemistry,        *^ 

'* the  idea  that  there  is  something  more  in  the 

concept  of  matter  than  the  expression  of  a  set  of 
experiences  and  their  reduction  to  a  law  of  nature 
has  persisted  from  earlier  times.  Matter  is  looked 
upon  as  something  originally  existing,  which  is  at 
the  bottom  of  all  phenomena  and  in  a  sense  in- 
dependent of  them  all.  The  concept  of  matter 
can  be  shown,  however,  to  be  made  up  of  the 
simpler  concepts  weight,  mass,  and  volume,  and 
it  is  certainly  less  fundamental  than  these.  The 
law  of  the  invariable  connection  of  these  properties 
has  already  been  expressed  in  the  concepts  body 
and  substance,**  [I  should  prefer  to  use  only  the 
former  of  these  terms  in  this  sense]  **  so  there  is  no 
necessity  for  the  formation  of  a  new  concept  to 
express  the  same  thing.  The  word  *  matter  *  is 
so  closely  connected  with  the  ideas  mentioned 
above  that  it  is  not  advisable  to  retain  it ;  we  shall 
therefore  not  make  any  use  of  it  whatever.*'  * 

§  8.  This  brings  me  to  the  second  use  of  the  Matter  as  a 
word   *' matter.*'    By   materialistic   philosophers  ^"^^^^ 

*  WiLHELM    OsTWALD  :     The     Fundamental  r  Principles    of 
Chemistry  (trans,  by  H.  W.  Morse,  1909),  §  7. 


22        THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE    [§8 

the  term  '*  matter  *'  is  employed  not  merely  to 
connote  the  fact  that  sense-impressions  always 
occur  in  definite  groups,  but  as  supplying  an 
explanation  of  this  fact.  Matter  is  supposed  to 
be  a  thing-in-itselft  something  existing  outside  of 
all  conscious  beings,  independent,  in  a  sense,  of 
all  phenomena  and  all  experience.  In  other  words, 
Matter  is  regarded  as  Substance  in  the  meta- 
physical and  not  Professor  Ostwald's  meaning  of 
that  term.  This  hypothetical  matter  is  supposed 
to  possess  certain  properties  or  attributes,  each  of 
which  is  held  to  be  responsible  for  a  definite  sense- 
impression.  Thus,  we  find  certain  sense-impres- 
sions, such  as  roundness,  yellowness,  smoothness, 
juiciness  and  a  characteristic  taste  and  smell, 
grouped  together,  and  this  we  call  **  an  orange.*' 
According  to  the  materialistic  theory,  each  one 
of  these  sense-impressions  is  dependent  upon  a 
certain  property  of  matter  ;  we  find  them  always 
grouped  together  in  this  way,  because  the  pro- 
perties of  matter  on  which  they  depend  are  always 
grouped  together  in  the  same  portion  of  matter — 
the  real  material  orange.  We  can  experience  a 
mental  image  of  a  pink  orange  or  a  cubical  orange  ; 
but  we  cannot  experience  the  corresponding 
sense-impressions,  because  a  real  pink  material 
orange  or  a  real  cubical  material  orange  does  not 
exist* 


§9]  IDEALISM  23 

§  9»  But  if  one  presses  the  materialist,  he  is  Criticism  of 
obliged  to  confess  that  matter  possesses  neither 
colour,  taste  nor  smell.  The  material  orange,  he 
will  tell  you,  is  not  really  yellow,  nor  has  it 
any  odour  or  taste  in  itself.  These,  so-called 
secondary  properties  of  matter,  are,  he  says,  not 
inherent  in  matter  itself,  but  are  produced  by  the 

^  interaction  between  it  and  the  bodily  senses.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  maintained  that  the  so-called 
primary  properties  of  matter,  such  as  size,  shape, 
motion,  etc.,  do  exist  in  it  apart  from  any  perceiv- 

"*  ing  mind.  But,  as  Berkeley  showed,  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  so-called  primary  and  secondary 
properties  of  matter  is  essentially  a  vicious  one; 
for  size,  shape,  motion,  etc.,  are  as  much  ideas  of 
sensation  as  are  colours,  tastes  and  odours,  and  as 
such  exist  equally  only  in  a  perceiving  mind. 
**  Some  truths  there  are,*'  says  Berkeley,  **  so  near 
and  obvious  to  the  mind,  that  a  man  need  only 
open  his  eyes  to  see  them.  Such  I  take  this  im- 
portant one  to  be,  to  wit,  that  all  the  choir  of  heaven 
and  furniture  of  the  earth,  in  a  word  all  those  bodies 
which  compose  the  mighty  frame  of  the  world,  have 
not  any  subsistence  without  a  mind,  that  their  being 
(esse)  is  to  be  perceived  or  known;  that  conse- 
quently so  long  as  they  are  not  actually  perceived 
by  me,  or  do  not  exist  in  my  mind  or  that  of  any 
other  created  spirit,  they  must  either  have  no  exist- 


24        THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE    [§9 

ence  at  all,  or  else  subsist  in  the  mind  of  some  eternal 
spirit  :  it  being  perfectly  unintelligible  and  involv- 
ing all  the  absurdity  of  abstraction,  to  attribute  to 
any  single  part  of  them  an  existence  independent 
of  a  spirit.  To  be  convinced  of  which,  the  reader 
need  only  reflect  and  try  to  separate  in  his  own 
thoughts  the  being  of  a  sensible  thing  from  its 
being  perceived/*  ^ 

Matter  as  a  §  lO,  Even  according  to  the  materialistic  theory 
Unknowable  itself  it  is  evident  that  we  can  know  nothing  of 
matter  beyond  its  properties,  nothing  of  matter 
itself,  since  ex  hypothesi  matter  exists  outside  of 
mind  and  is,  therefore,  unknowable ♦  Divest  an 
orange  of  all  its  properties  and  what  remains  ^ 
If  the  materialistic  theory  were  true,  we  should 
have  pure  matter,  matter  in  itself ;  but,  in  point  of 
fact,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  we  have  absolutely 
nothing.  It  seems,  therefore,  rather  absurd  to 
limit  the  application  of  the  term  **  real  **  to  the 
hypothetical  material  orange  —  using  the  term 
**  material  **  as  the  materialists  employ  it,  as 
denoting  not  merely  a  phenomenon,  but  a  thing-in- 
itself  existing  apart  from  mind.  Is  it  not  evident 
that  the  sum  of  the  sense-impressions  connoted 
by  the  term,  the  phenomenal  orange,  is  the  real 

'  George  Berkeley  :  Of  the  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge 
(edition  in  Everyman's  Library ;  edited  by  A,  D.  Lindsay),  §  vi. 


\ 


§  II  ]  IDEALISM  25 

orange,  the  only  orange  we  do  and  can  know^ 
In  other  words,  is  it  not  evident  that  a  material 
body  is  merely  the  sum  of  its  properties,  which  are 
sense-impressions  and  thus  exist  only  in  mind  i 

§  1 1  ♦  To  such  an  extent  has  our  language  be-  Subjective 
come  impregnated  by  materialistic  ideas  that  the 
term  **  imaginary '*  has  come  to  mean  something 
the  reverse  of  real :  the  assumption  underlying  this 
use  of  the  word,  of  course,  is  that  reality  is 
connoted  by  the  term  **  matter/*  It  is  abundantly 
evident,  however,  that  a  mental  image  —  an 
**  imaginary  *'  thing  —  is  a  real  existence  in  the 
individual  mind»  The  comparative  unimportance 
of  mental  images  is  not  because  they  are  unreal, 
but  because  they  are  almost  entirely  under  our 
control.  If  I  experience  those  sense-impressions  I 
call  **  putting  my  hand  in  the  fire,**  then,  inevitably, 
I  shall  also  experience  a  very  vivid  sensation  of  pain, 
and  not  only  this,  but  it  may  very  probably  happen 
that  the  possibility  of  my  experiencing  other  sensa- 
tions may  become  permanently  inhibited  —  in 
ordinary  language,  my  hand  may  be  permanently  * 

destroyed.  It  is  highly  important,  therefore,  that 
I  do  not  experience  those  sense-impressions  I  call 
**  putting  my  hand  in  the  fire/*  But  the  corre- 
sponding play  of  ideas  in  the  imagination  implies 
no  such  unpleasant  consequences.     I  can  mentally 


\ 


26       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§ii 

reproduce  or  imagine  the  series  of  sense-impres- 
sions of  putting  my  hand  in  the  fire  and  then 
banish  the  ideas  from  my  mind.  When  this 
power  of  control  over  mental  images  is  lost  or  in- 
hibited, as  in  dreams,  hysteria  and  madness 
generally,  they  are  no  longer  distinguished  from 
sense-impressions.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that 
we  call  sensations  **  real,**  and  mental  images 
**  unreal,**  not  because  they  are  thus  distinguished, 
for  clearly  both  forms  of  experience  are  real  as  such 
(though,  indeed,  sense-impressions  are  generally 
more  **  real,**  in  the  sense  of  more  viwid,  than 
mental  images),  but  because  the  latter  are  in  every 
sense  our  own,  originating  and  existing  only  in  our 
individual  minds  ;  whereas  our  sense-impressions 
are  determined  according  to  an  order  (laws  of 
y  nature)  imposed  on  us  from  without  and  in  virtue 
of  which  our  control  of  them  is  strictly  limited ♦ 

The  Laws  of     §  1 2,  Of  course,  in  a  manner,  our  individual 

Nature  Uni-  .  .  1  r  1  r  1 

versally  Valid  sense-impressions  are  real  tor  each  one  01  us  alone ♦ 
As  sensations  they  exist  in  the  minds  of  each  one  of 
us,  and  for  each  one  of  us  alone.  But  in  another 
manner  our  sense-impressions  are,  to  a  large  extent, 
universally  valid.  It  is  not,  however,  altogether 
easy  to  make  plain  exactly  in  what  way  this  state- 
ment is  true,  without  involving  the  hypothesis  of 
an  external  world ;    and  from  this  fact  may  be 


§12]  IDEALISM  37 

concluded  the  validity  of  such  a  hypothesis,  when 
divested  of  the  untenable  assumption  that  the 
matter  of  this  world  is  anything  more  than  the 
sum  of  its  properties,  anything  more  than  itself  a 
phenomenon,  existing  only  in  mind*  For  although 
the  external  world  is  external  to  my  individual 
mind,  it  cannot  be  external  to  mind  considered 
universally.  We  must,  on  the  other  hand,  beware 
of  overstating  the  facts»  We  are  not  justified  in 
saying  that  the  world  which  exists  in  one  individual 
mind  is  the  same  as  that  which  exists  in  the  mind  of 
some  other  individual.  Indeed,  we  cannot  even 
say  that  for  any  two  individuals,  sense-impressions 
are  identical  which  are  denoted  by  the  same  name, 
for  we  have  no  means  of  directly  comparing  sensa- 
tions existing  in  different  individual  minds.  Thus 
you  and  I  may  agree  as  to  what  bodies  are  red,  but 
how  is  it  possible  to  determine  whether  the  sense- 
impression  I  call  **  red  **  is  the  same  as  that  which 
you  call  **  red  "  $*  All  we  can  state  is  the  principle 
of  relativity  :  though,  indeed,  this  is  of  immense 
importance.  Our  individual  sense-impressions, 
said  to  be  one  in  origin,  may  or  may  not  be  different ; 
V  but  the  relations  or  connections  between  them, 
we  know,  are  identical.  Thus,  the  distance  I  call 
**  one  inch  ''  may  be  longer  to  me  than  to  you,  but 
for  both  of  us  the  distance  called  **  two  inches  " 
is  twice  that  called  '*  one  inch/*     My  red  may 


28       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§12 

not  be  your  red,  but  we  are  entirely  agreed  as  to 
what  bodies  are  red*  In  other  words,  the  same 
laws  of  nature  are  true  for  all  of  us :  our  individual 
sense-impressions  are  all  subject  to  the  same  rules 
of  order  and  sequence*  It  is  not  merely  true  for 
me  that  the  series  of  sense-impressions  I  call 
**  putting  my  hand  in  the  fire  **  is  followed  by 
intense  pain ;  this  and  all  other  determinations  in 
the  orders  and  sequences  of  sense-impressions 
which  lie  beyond  man*s  control  are  true  for  every 
individual*  A  teacher  is  lecturing  at  the  black- 
board to  an  attentive  class  ;  if  one  of  the  students 
experiences,  at  some  moment,  a  mental  image  of  the 
blackboard  faUing  over,  it  certainly  by  no  means 
follows  that  any  other,  or  others,  of  the  students 
present  will  experience  a  like  mental  image*  On 
the  other  hand,  however,  if  one  of  the  students 
experiences  the  corresponding  sense-impressions, 
each  one  of  the  students  present  will,  in  general, 
experience  corresponding  sense-impressions*  This 
fact  is  expressed  by  saying  that,  in  the  latter  case, 
the  hypothetical  material  blackboard  giving  rise 
to  the  sense-impressions  of  a  blackboard  in  the 
mind  of  each  student  has  actually  fallen  over ; 
though  we  really  know  nothing  beyond  the  fact 
that  all  the  individuals  present  experienced  corre- 
sponding sense-impressions* 


§13]  IDEALISM  29 

§13^We   must,  however,  guard   against   the  Jhe  Laws  of 
'  7       ...  -  Nature  not 

error  that  there  is  any  necessity  in  the  laws  of  Necessary 

nature  ♦  It  follows  from  what  has  already  been 
said  on  the  subject  that  a  law  of  nature  is  merely 
a  statement  in  terms  as  general  as  possible  of 
what  sense-impressions  we  may  expect  to  follow 
any  given  series  of  other  sense-impressions.  Our 
knowledge  of  these  laws  is  wholly  empirical,  ue*, 
derived  from  experience.  Indeed,  John  Stuart 
Mill,  in  his  System  of  Logic,^  conclusively  shows 
that  this  is  true  even  of  the  most  fundamental  laws 
of  Science,  the  axioms  of  Mathematics,  and  the 
term  **  necessary  **  applies  to  them  in  no  sense 
other  than  that  of  **  most  certain/*  Now,  the 
mere  certainty  of  any  fact  of  experience  supplies 
us  with  no  explanation  of  its  occurrence.  The 
supposed  necessity  of  the  laws  of  nature  leaves 
us  entirely  in  the  dark  as  to  why  our  sense-im- 
pressions should  occur  in  the  regular  sequences 
in  which  they  do,  or  why  they  should  follow  any 
regular  order  at  all.  Indeed,  the  only  explanation 
that  is  possible  is  the  attribution  of  them  to  an 
active  agent,  i.e.,  a  Spirit  or  Will,  which  pre- 
fers, for  our  benefit  and  guidance,  to  operate 
in  a  regular,  rather  than  in  a  capricious, 
manner. 

•  See  the  Section  on  "Necessary  Truths/* 


30       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§14 
The  Exist-        §  14.  Moreover,  we  find  that  it  is  not  always 

ence  of  2 

Universal  necessary  to  the  fulfilment  of  a  natural  law,  for 
the  preceding  sequence  of  sense-imp.!  ssions  to 
be  restricted  to  one  mind.  Indeed,  we  often 
experience  the  consequents  of  laws  which  have,  so 
to  speak,  worked  apart  from  the  individual  mind 
altogether,  and  we  are  compelled  to  postulate  a 
Divine,  z.e.,  a  Universal,  Mind. 

We  cannot,  in  truth,  restrict  the  Universe  to 
the  concept  of  it  in  the  individual  mind.  The 
possibilities  of  sense  -  impressions  far  transcend 
\  the  experience  of  any  individual,  or  even  the  ex- 
periences of  all  individuals.  Processes  take  place 
\.  which  no  man  has  ever  experienced,  and  which, 
therefore,  do  not  exist  in  the  individual  mind, 
processes  which  we  know  must  have  taken  place 
because  the  results  of  such  do  come  within  the 
experience  of  the  individual.  We  cannot  believe, 
for  example,'  that  the  flowers  and  the  trees,  the 
stones  and  rivers  of  some  hitherto  unexplored  and 
uninhabited  country,  spring  into  existence  the 
moment  they  begin  to  exist  in  the  mind  of  the 
explorer.  We  must  at  least  admit  the  perennial 
possibility  of  their  existence  as  sense-impressions 
in  any  and  every  individual  mind.  In  other  words, 
we  must  admit  the  existence  of  a  world  external  to 

'  All  the  facts  of  Evolution  may  also  be  quoted  in  support  of 
the  above  conclusion. 


§15]  IDEALISM  31 

us,  existing  for  us  as  **  a  permanent  possibility  of 
sensation/'  to  use  John  Stuart  Mill's  apt  phrase. 
This  world  may  be  referred  to  as  an  objective, 
material  world ;  but  here,  of  course,  the  word 
**  material  **  has  a  very  different  connotation 
from  that  with  which  materiahstic  philosophers 
employ  it. 

§  15.  Care  must  be  taken,  however,  when  we  Externality 
speak  of  a  world  external  to  us,  not  to  understand  ^  ^ 
this  in  a  spatial  sense.  Materialistic  philosophy 
has  made  us  apt  to  think  of  **  within  **  as  referring 
to  that  portion  of  space  marked  out  by  our  bodies, 
and  **  without  **  as  referring  to  the  rest  of  space^ 
A  little  reflection,  however,  shows  that  this  is  an 
error.  By  the  **  within  **  is  meant  the  region 
where  our  will  reigns  supreme,  where,  flowing  only 
into  thought  and  not  into  action,  the  will  meets 
with  no  opposition  ;  in  other  words,  the  **  within  ** 
is  the  realm  of  Imagination.  By  the  **  without " 
is  meant,  on  the  other  hand,  that  region  where  the 
will,  flowing  into  action,  meets  with  felt  opposition; 
in  other  words,  the  realm  of  Nature.  All  our 
actions  may,  in  the  last  analysis,  be  reduced  to  the 
effecting  of  accelerations  and  retardations  of  the 
motions  of  bodies,  and  there  is  no  body  so  flimsy 
and  light  as  not  to  exhibit  inertia,  i.e.,  resistance  to 
change  of  uniform  motion  ;  indeed,  we  can  never 


32       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§15 

get  rid  of  friction,  and  that  resists,  not  merely 
change  of  motion,  but  motion  itself.  Were  it 
possible  to  annihilate  the  inertias  of  bodies,  it 
<.  seems  highly  probable  that  the  distinction  between 
the  **  within  *'  and  the  **  without  *'  would  vanish  ; 
hence  this  distinction  is  not  one  of  space  ♦  More- 
over, however  closely  we  may  examine  man's  body, 
nowhere  do  we  discover  pure  will :  we  do,  indeed, 
observe  many  of  its  effects,  but  so  do  we  in  the 
world  that  lies  outside  of  his  body*  We  may 
search  the  tiniest  cells  of  the  body,  yet  spirit,  the 
**  within,*'  eludes  us.  Evidently,  therefore,  spirit 
is  not  in  space.  Indeed,  no  other  conclusion 
could  be  possible,  since  space,  being  an  idea,  can 
exist  only  in  mind  or  spirit ;  and  if  space  exists  in 
spirit,  spirit  cannot  exist  in  space.  The  fact  that  the 
external  world  is  the  product  of  a  Will  not  our  own 
constitutes  its  externahty,  and  not  any  supposed 
spatial  relations  between  it  and  us. 

Fallacy  of  §  16*  The  laws  of  nature,  i.e.,  the  determina- 

Sdenc'l^^^'*  tions  of  the  Divine  Will,  are  universally  true; 
Metaphysics  ^^  least,  SO  far  as  our  experience  allows  us  to 
judge.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  world 
of  sensuous  experience  is  not  an  illusion  of 
**  the  mortal  mind,*'  as  is  taught  by  the 
metaphysics  of  *'  Christian  Science."  It  is  neces- 
sary to  insist  on  this  point,  because  it  is  very 


§i6]  IDEALISM  33 

frequently  thought  that  epistemological  idealism, 

as    elaborated    by   Berkeley   and    his   followers, 

supports  this  chief  tenet  of  *'  Christian  Science/' 

Nothing  of  the  sort  is  true*    Berkeley  everywhere 

asserts    the    validity   of   our    sense-impressions, 

arguing  against  the  materialistic  philosophers  who 

would  also  (though  in  another  manner)  make  them 

to  some  extent  misleading.    The  same  laws  of 

nature,  i.e.,  the  same  orderly  sequences  in  our 

sense-impressions,  hold  good  for  every  one  of 

us,  whether  we  know  of  them  or  not :  the  result 

is  always  that  predicted  by  such  laws  whether 

expected  or  not.    For  example :  A  student  who  is 

beginning  the  study  of  Chemistry  adds  a  drop  or 

two  of  litmus  solution  to  a  mineral  acid  ;   a  red 

colour  is  invariably  the  result,  though  the  student 

^  may  have  no  idea  what  colour  to  expect,  or  may 

even,  through  some  error  or  the  other,  suppose 

that  it  will,  say,  be  green.    Surely  this  would  not 

be  the  case  if  sensuous  experience  were  merely  an 

illusion  of  the  mortal  mind  <    Such  facts  are, 

indeed,  entirely  destructive  of  **  Christian  Science  ** 

metaphysics,  which  confuses  mental  images  with 

sense-impressions ;    though  they  are  entirely  in 

accord  with  the  teachings  of  genuine  Ideahsm, 

which  sharply  distinguishes  between  these  two 

forms  of  experience,  attributing  the  former  to  our 

own  wills,  but  the  latter  to  a  Divine  Will,  which 

c 


\ 


\ 


34       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§i6 

out  of  pure  Groodness  always  operates  constantly 
and  in  the  same  way* 


Objective  §  17,  We  see,  therefore,  that  whilst  the  reality 

of  the  ideas  of  our  imaginations  is  purely  indi- 
vidual or  subjective — '*  imaginary  **  money,  for 
example,  is  quite  as  good  as  so-called  **  real  *' 
money,  so  far  as  he  who  imagines  is  concerned ; 
but  it  will  not  satisfy  his  creditors,  for  their 
imaginations  are  not  forming  a  like  product — 
sense-impressions  are,  in  a  manner,  universally 
true ;  they  do,  to  some  extent,  inform  us  of 
objective  truths  Hence,  we  are  justified  in  postu- 
lating the  existence  of  an  objective  world,  which 
may  be  termed  **  material  **  if  one  pleases.  But, 
since  all  experience  and  knowledge  is  evidently  sub- 
jective, Le*,  existing  only  in  mind,  absolute  objec- 
tivity is  unthinkable.  With  the  postulation  of  the 
Divine  Mind,  however,  this  difficulty  is  overcome ; 
and  we  realise  that  what  we,  in  our  ignorance,  call 
**  objective  *'  is  really  subjective — subjective  to,  Le*, 
existing  in,  the  Divine  Mind. 


Nature  as  §  1 8.  Here  also  is  to  be  found  the  answer  to  the 

ternalit^"    objection  that  to  make  reahty  subjective  is  to  make 

reality  relative.    As  I  have  elsewhere  remarked. 

We  may  quite  correcdy  speak  of  the  physical 


** 


§i8]  roEALISM  35 

universe  as  an  idea  in  the  mind  of  God  ;  but  this 
does  not  mean  that  it  is  in  any  sense  unreal — to 
be  an  idea  in  the  Divine  Mind  is  the  essence  of 
reality ;  nought  else  is  truly  real  save  that  which 
is  such.  And  it  is  because  spirit  is  what  it  is, 
because  of  our  hkeness  (faint  though  it  may  be) 
to  Grod,  that  this  real  physical  universe  is  possible 
to  some  extent  to  us  as  an  ideal  construction  cor- 
responding to  the  Divine  ideal  construction.  The 
*  external  *  world  we  know  is  the  world  as  it  exists 
in  each  of  our  minds  ;  the  real  ^  external  *  world 
is  the  world  as  it  exists  in  the  Divine  Mind  ;  in  so 
far,  then,  as  our  ideal  constructions  are  Hke  to  the 
Divine  do  we  know  Reality  **  ^ — reahty,  that  is, 
which  is  not  merely  individual,  but  universal  and 
Divine,  in  other  words,  objective  reality.  Of 
course,  when  I  speak  of  the  physical  universe  as 
an  idea  in  the  Divine  Mind,  this  must  be  under- 
stood as  an  idea  which  is  outspoken  or  willed  forth ; 
in  a  word.  Nature  is  to  be  understood  as  the  Divine 
Externality.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  all  science — 
every  endeavour  to  co-ordinate  and  interpret  sense- 
impressions  so  as  to  eliminate  the  errors  of  the 
individual,  and  arrive  at  truths  universally  valid — 
all  genuine  science,  is  an  attempt  rightly  to  read 
the  thoughts  of  God,  rightly  to  understand  His 
Will. 

*  Matter,  Spirit  and  the  Cosmos  (Rider,  1910),  §  87. 


36       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§19 

Extenceof       §  19*  Many  persons,   however,   whilst  highly 
God  more        ,\  ^,    ,.      .        .         ^     ,         '    .  ,       ^    . 

sure  than  that  desirous  of  beueving  in  a  God,  a  Being  of  Infinite 

of  other  Men  LQ^g  and  Wisdom,  the  Creator  and  Sustainer  of 
every  finite  mind  and  of  that  vast  and  mighty 
Phenomenon  we  call  **  Nature,*'  regard  this  fond 
belief  as  an  act  of  faith  rather  than  as  the  product 
of  reason*  But  we  have  seen  how  the  logic  of 
experience  absolutely  forces  us  into  this  belief, 
and,  indeed,  as  Berkeley  has  shown,  we  have 
more  sure  grounds  for  a  belief  in  the  existence  of 
that  Infinite  Will  and  Wisdom  we  call  Grod,  than 
we  have  for  that  of  finite  minds  other  than  our  own. 

He  says,  ** ^it  is  plain  that  we  cannot  know  the 

existence  of  other  spirits  otherwise  than  by  their 
operations,  or  the  ideas  by  them  excited  in  us*  I 
perceive  several  motions,  changes,  and  combina- 
tions of  ideas,  that  inform  me  there  are  certain 
particular  agents  like  myself,  which  accompany 
them,  and  concur  in  their  production*  Hence  the 
knowledge  I  have  of  other  spirits  is  not  immediate, 
as  is  the  knowledge  of  my  ideas ;  but  depending 
on  the  intervention  of  ideas,  by  me  referred  to 
agents  or  spirits  distinct  from  myself,  as  effects  or 
concomitant  signs* 

**  But  though  there  be  some  things  which  con- 
vince us  human  agents  are  concerned  in  pro- 
ducing them ;  yet  it  is  evident  to  every  one,  that 
those  things  which  are  called  the  works  of  nature. 


§  19  ]  IDEALISM  37 

that  is,  the  far  greater  part  of  the  ideas  or  sensations 
perceived  by  us,  are  not  produced  by,  or  dependent 
on,  the  wills  of  men.  There  is  therefore  some 
other  spirit  that  causes  them,  since  it  is  repugnant 
that  they  should  subsist  by  themselves,  ♦  ♦  ♦  But 
if  we  attentively  consider  the  constant  regularity, 
order,  and  concatenation  of  natural  things,  the  sur- 
prising magnificence,  beauty,  and  perfection  of  the 
larger,  and  the  exquisite  contrivance  of  the  smaller 
parts  of  the  creation,  together  with  the  exact 
harmony  and  correspondence  of  the  whole,  but, 
above  all,  the  never  enough  admired  laws  of  pain 
and  pleasure,  and  the  instincts  or  natural  inclina- 
tions, appetites,  and  passions  of  animals  ;  I  say  if 
we  consider  all  these  things,  and  at  the  same  time 
attend  to  the  meaning  and  import  of  the  attributes, 
one,  eternal,  infinitely  wise,  good,  and  perfect,  we 
shall  clearly  perceive  that  they  belong  to  the  afore- 
said spirit,  who  works  all  in  all,  and  by  whom  all 
things  consist, 

**  ♦  ♦  ♦  Hence  it  is  evident,  that  God  is  known 
as  certainly  and  immediately  as  any  other  mind 
or  spirit  whatsoever,  distinct  from  ourselves.  We 
may  even  assert,  that  the  existence  of  God  is  far 
more  evidently  perceived  than  the  existence  of  men; 
because  the  effects  of  nature  are  infinitely  more 
numerous  and  considerable  than  those  ascribed  to 
human  agents.    There  is  not  any  one  mark  that 


38       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§19 

denotes  a  man,  or  effect  produced  by  him,  which 
doth  not  more  strongly  evince  the  being  of  that 
Spirit  who  is  the  Author  of  nature.  For  it  is 
evident  that  in  affecting  other  persons,  the  will  of 
man  hath  no  other  object  than  barely  the  motion  of 
the  limbs  of  his  body;  but  that  such  a  motion 
should  be  attended  by,  or  excite  any  idea  in  the 
mind  of  another,  depends  wholly  on  the  will  of  the 
Creator,  He  it  is  who,  *  upholding  all  things  by 
the  word  of  his  power,*  maintains  that  intercourse 
between  spirits,  whereby  they  are  able  to  perceive 
the  existence  of  each  other.  And  yet  this  pure 
and  clear  light,  which  enlightens  everyone,  is  itself 
invisible  to  the  greatest  part  of  mankind."  ^ 

And  even  if  later  in  the  course  of  this  book  the 
possibility  of  a  more  intimate  knowledge  of  God 
becomes  apparent,  nevertheless  Berkeley's  positive 
conclusions  still  remain  true* 

Spiritual  §  20.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  cannot  Berkeley's 

objections  to  the  existence  of  material  substance  {i*e* 
unthinking  substance,  existing  in  itself  out  of  mind) 
be  also  advanced  against  the  existence  of  mind  ^ 
Indeed,  did  not  Hume  thus  succeed  in  disproving 
the  existence  of  soul  and  spirit,  and  in  reducing  the 
individual  to  a  mere  series  of  separate  sensa- 
tions or  phenomena  ^    To  me,  however,  Hume's 

•  George  Berkeley  :  Of  the  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge, 
§§  cxlv,  to  cxlvii. 


\ 


§20]  IDEALISM  39 

arguments  seem  altogether  fallacious.    Firstly,  we 

may  note  that  our  sensations  are  connected,  as  we 

have  seen  and  as  Hume  admits,  according  to  those 

definite  rules  of  order  and  sequence  called  the 

laws  of  nature.    But  not  only  in  this  way  are  they 

connected.     If,  given  every  sensation  which  has 

ever  and  will  ever  exist,  we  could  mark  out  certain 

sequences  according  to  these  rules,  we  could  also 

mark  out  certain  other  sequences  connected  by  the 

fact  of  memory.    Just  as  the  laws  of  nature  indicate 

the  existence  of  God,  so  does  memory  indicate  the 

existence  of  the  individual  spirit ;  and  for  this  to  be 

true  it  is  not  at  all  necessary  that  memory  should 

be  capable  of  recalling  the  whole  past  history  of 

the  individual,  but  merely  that  it  should  link 

together  every  moment  of  its  consciousness  with 

the  immediately  preceding  one,  so  as  to  make  it 

possible  to  trace  out  the  above-mentioned  sequence. 

This  memory  always  does.    The  sense-impressions 

I  call  **  mine  **  are  related  to  one  another  quite 

differently  from  the  manner  in  which  they  are 

rilated  to  those   I  call  **  yours  ** ;    this  is  just 

because   they  are   mine,   z.e.,  because  they  find 

their  unity  in  one  mind  or  spirit — myself. 

It  may  perhaps  be  incorrect  to  say  that  I  have  an 

idea  of  a  spirit,^'^  and,  therefore,  of  myself  as  such. 

"  Berkeley  admits  this,  but  argues  that  we  have  a  notion  of 
spirit,  inasmuch  as  we  know  what  the  word  means  and  that  we, 
as  spirits,  do  exist. 


40       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§20 

But  the  fact  that  I  have  any  idea  at  all  is  to  me  proof 
of  my  own  existence  as  a  spirit.  For  even  could  I 
doubt  my  existence,  that  fact  would  itself  prove 
my  existence  as  a  doubting,  Le.,  a  thinking,  being. 
Descartes  was  certainly  right  when  he  said,  **  I 
think,  therefore  I  am  *' — all  the  argument  in  the 
world,  though  it  may  do  anything  with  words,  can 
never  destroy  this  fundamental  fact  of  experience. 
Descartes  conclusively  shows  that  if  we  make 
clear  knowledge  our  criterion  of  truth,  whatever  we 
doubt,  we  can  never  doubt  the  fact  of  our  own 
being. 

The  Signifi-  §  21.  But  if  the  individual  spirit  can  have  an 
Telepathy  immediate  knowledge  of  his  own  existence  not 
derived  through  ideas  of  sense,  may  it  not  be 
possible  for  him  to  have  a  hke  knowledge  of  other 
spirits  ^  Berkeley  does  not  allow  this ;  but  I 
think  it  is  necesary  to  transcend  his  position,  with- 
out, however,  destroying  his  system  as  a  foundation 
upon  which  to  build.  If  we  ask  two  lovers  if  they 
know  each  other's  soul  only  through  each  other's 
bodily  actions,  will  they  not  tell  us  Nay,  and  assert 
a  more  interior  knowledge  i  Still,  lovers  are 
generally  prejudiced  folk,  so  the  philosopher  has 
to  regard  their  assertions  with  a  wary  eye.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  phenomena  grouped  under  the 
term  **  Telepathy,**  and  now  recognised  as  facts 


§22]  IDEALISM  41 

by  all  competent  authorities  (thanks  to  the  un- 
wearied labours  of  The  Society  for  Psychical 
Research),  certainly  seem  to  lend  some  justification 
to  this  belief.  For  here  we  have  the  undoubted 
transmission  of  ideas  from  mind  to  mind  without 
the  utilisation  of  the  known  organs  of  sense.  It  is, 
of  course,  true  that  what  are  conveyed  are  ideas,  so 
Berkeley's  fundamental  position  is  not  threatened  ; 
but  such  ideas  appear  to  be  transmitted  by  a  more 
interior  way  than  that  of  physical  sense.  Hence 
they  are  not  ideas  of  sensation,  though  objectively 
true.  Indeed,  they  seem  to  be  the  result  of  a 
direct  perception  by  one  mind  of  the  ideas  of 
another, 

§  22,  Moreover,  as  Berkeley  recognised,  besides  ideas : 
%  ideas,  we  may  also  have  notions  of  the  relations  n^^j"? 
between  ideas.  Here  we  seem  to  touch  the  very 
nature  of  Truth,  for  objective  (f,6,,  universal) 
Truth,  seems  not  so  much  to  reside  in  our  sense- 
impressions  as  in  the  relations  between  them 
(vide  §  12),  Indeed,  either  inductive  reasoning, 
whereby  we  pass  from  particulars  to  generals, 
gaining  objective  truth  from  subjective  fact,  has 
to  be  scorned  as  presumption  (which  all  our  grow- 
ing experience  forbids  us  to  do),  or  else  we  must 
admit  that  experience  involves  a  higher  element 
than  ideas  of  sensation  and  reproductive  imagina- 


42      THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE    [§22 

tion.  For,  in  inductive  reasoning,  the  mind  is, 
as  it  were,  enabled,  in  the  light  of  a  higher  vision, 
to  leap  ahead  and  to  grasp  a  truth  transcending  all 
the  particular  facts  that  are  given*  We  may, 
perhaps,  denominate  the  object  of  this  experience 
**  an  idea,''  or  we  may  prefer  Berkeley's  term  **  a 
notion  " — the  mere  words  we  use  are  not  of  great 
importance,  so  long  as  the  meaning  is  clearly 
understood ; — ^but  in  the  former  case,  we  must 
admit  the  existence  of  distinct  classes  or  grades  of 
ideas — **  discrete  "  degrees  of  ideas,  to  use  a  very 
useful  term  due  to  Swedenborg*  There  are  ideas 
which,  as  it  were,  are  exterior  and  physical  and 
only  inform  us  of  the  cortex  of  spirit ;  there  are 
others  which  are  more  interior,  more  spiritual, 
and  allow  us  to  penetrate  more  closely  to  the  core 
of  spirit.  A  man  who  is  aware  of  his  sensations 
may  be  said  to  know  something  of  the  externality 
of  God  ;  but  how  far  more  deeply  into  the  know- 
ledge of  the  Divine  Being  has  the  man  of  science 
penetrated,  who  knows  and  appreciates  the  laws 
of  nature*  And  having  once  admitted  a  scale  of 
discrete  ideas,  having  once  admitted  the  possibility 
of  penetrating  more  deeply  into  the  knowledge  of 
God  than  is  possible  by  the  mere  observation, 
without  comparison  and  co-ordination,  of  the 
varied  phenomena  of  Nature,  who  shall  state 
where  the  process  is  to  end  i 


§23]  roEALISM  43 

§  23.  Now,  it  is  to  connote  this  belief  that  a  JJ^^^  ^ 
more  intimate  knowledge  of  God  and  the  spiritual 
is  possible  than  is  given  by  physical  science  (Le., 
the  discovery  of  natural  laws  by  the  co-ordina- 
tion of  the  phenomena  of  sense  ^^)  that  the  term 
**  Mysticism  '*  is  here  employed.  The  word  is  a 
very  ambiguous  one,  and  some  remarks  on  its 
diverse  applications  seem  a  necessary  preliminary 
to  Part  IL  of  this  book, 

**  The  modem  mystic/*  writes  Mr.  H.  G.  Wells, 
'*  is  commonly  a  poor  fool,  on  the  verge  of  entire 
intellectual  disorganisation.*'  That  there  is  a 
large  element  of  truth  in  this  caustic  remark  must 
be  admitted.  We  all  know  the  type  of  person  to 
whom  Mr.  Wells  refers,  whose  so-called  mysticism 
consists,  say,  in  visiting  a  Bond  Street  palmiste,  in 
frequenting  the  seances  of  some  spiritistic  wonder- 
worker,and  in  talking  analmost  unintelligible  jargon 
composed  of  all  that  is  bad  and  stupid  and  nothing 
of  what  is  really  good  and  wise  in  Kabbalism  and 
Buddhism.  But  surely  there  has  been  some  mis- 
use of  language  when  the  denomination  **  mystic  ** 
is  applied  not  only  to  this  **  poor  fool,**  but  to 

^^  By  this  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  the  method  of  Mysticism 
is  unscientific,  in  the  sense  of  not  proceeding  by  the  inductive 
method  (since  the  reverse  of  this  is  my  belief  as  concerns  the 
highest  Mysticism),  but  that  the  experiences  dealt  with  belong 
to  a  different  order  from  that  of  ideas  gained  through  the  physical 
senses. 


44       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§23 

philosophers  of  profound  wisdom  and  persons  of 
saintly  lives  ^  Surely,  to  take  a  modern  instance, 
we  do  not  reckon  Maurice  Maeterlinck  a  **poor 
fool/*  though  he  is  universally  allowed  to  be  a 
**  mystic  **  i  For  my  part  I  prefer  to  use  the 
word  **  Mysticism  **  in  its  nobler,  and  as  I  think, 
truer  sense,  as  connoting,  in  Dean  Inge's  fine 
phrase,  **  the  attempt  to  realise  the  presence  of  the 
living  God  in  the  soul  and  in  nature,  or,  more 
generally,  as  the  attempt  to  realise,  in  thought  and 
feeling,  the  immanence  of  the  temporal  in  the  eternal, 
^  and  of  the  eternal  in  the  temporal ;  **  ^^  and  not  to 
degrade  the  word  by  using  it  as  a  synonym  for 
intellectual  and  moral  insanity. 

Mysticism  as  §  24*  Before  proceeding  to  a  discussion  of 
Life°  ^°  Mysticism  in  its  epistemological  aspect,  some 
further  remarks  are  necessary.  Mysticism  is  not 
primarily  or  essentially  a  system  of  philosophy, 
'^  but  a  mode  of  life.  It  is  a  life  of  devotion  to  God, 
Whose  presence  is  everywhere  realised.  Some 
mystics,  in  other  directions  notably  great,  have,  it 
must  be  regretfully  admitted,  regarded  the  true  life 
of  devotion  as  necessitating  retirement  from  the 
world  rather  than  the  performance  of  useful 
service  to  humanity.    This  error,  however,  should 

"  William  Ralph  Inge,  M.A, :    Christian  Mysticism  (The 
Bampton  Lectures,  1899),  p,  5, 


§34]  IDEALISM  45 

be  attributed  to  the  age  in  which  they  hved,  rather 
than  to  their  mysticism  per  se.  In  spirit,  and, 
indeed,  frequently,  if  not  always,  in  practice,  the 
ethics  of  Mysticism  have  more  sympathy  with  the 
Utilitarianism  of  John  Stuart  Mill  than  with  the 
life  of  the  cloister.  Swedenborg  is  undoubtedly 
the  best  guide  here,  and  he  develops  his  system  of 
altruistic  ethics — showing  that  the  noblest,  best 
and  happiest  life  is  that  which  ministers  to  the 
permanent  happiness  of  others — with  a  spiritual 
insight  which  Mill  lacked  ♦ 

However,  this  book  is  not  a  work  on  ethics,  and 
Mysticism  as  a  mode  of  life  is  a  subject  outside  our 
present  inquiry.  I  have  called  attention  to  the 
fact  that  Mysticism  is  essentially  a  mode  of  life  to 
obviate  any  misunderstanding  that  might  other- 
wise be  occasioned  by  my  treatment  of  its  less 
essential  epistemological  aspect* 

One  additional  remark  concerning  the  scope  of 
my  enquiry  is  needed.  I  think  that,  amongst 
others,  certain  of  the  Persian  mystics,  such  as 
Sadi,  Jami  and  Jalalu*d-din  Riimi,  and  the  mystics 
of  the  Neo-Platonic  school,  are  very  deserving  of 
our  attention ;  but  not  unduly  to  prolong  the 
discussion  I  shall  restrict  myself  to  dealing  with 
Christian  mystics.  Christianity,  in  the  Person 
of  its  Founder,  supplies  the  mystic  with  an  object 
of  love  and  worship  and  an  ideal  of  attainment. 


46       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [  §  24 

both  definite  and  worthy  in  character,  such  as  is 
completely  to  be  found  in  no  other  religious  system. 
Moreover,  it  is  an  important  feature  of  Christianity, 
as  is  so  well  pointed  out  by  Sir  Oliver  Lodge  in 
The  Substance  of  Faith  allied  with  Science,  **  that 
it  recognises  as  good  the  connexion  between  spirit 
and  matter,  and  emphasises  the  importance  of 
both,  when  properly  regarded/*  In  virtue  of  this 
feature,  Christianity,  more  emphatically  than  any 
other  religion,  tends  to  produce  a  well-balanced 
life  and  to  foster  the  harmonious  development  of 
all  the  powers  of  man,  both  physical  and  spiritual, 
thus  leading  to  a  sane  Mysticism* 


PART  II 
MYSTICISM 


PART  II 

MYSTICISM 

§  25.  The  mystic  seeks  to  discover  God  within  The  Mystic 
the  hidden  ground  of  his  soul,  and  to  discern  the 
spiritual  significance  of  the  things  of  nature  and 
sensuous  experience.  He  seeks  for  God  and  the 
spiritual,  not  merely  as  logical  postulates  or  the 
necessary  hypotheses  of  a  rational  theory  of  the 
Cosmos,  but  as  actual  facts  of  experience.  As 
Professor  Pringle-Pattison  remarks  :  **  Mysticism 
.  .  .  appears  in  connexion  with  the  endeavour  of 
the  human  mind  to  grasp  the  divine  essence  or 
the  ultimate  reality  of  things,  and  to  enjoy 
the  blessedness  of  actual  communion  with  the 
Highest.  The  first  is  the  philosophic  side  of 
mysticism ;  the  second,  its  religious  side  .  .  . 
The  thought  that  is  most  intensely  present  with  the 
mystic  is  that  of  a  supreme,  all-pervading,  and 
indwelling  power,  in  whom  all  things  are  one.  .  .  . 
On  the  practical  side,  mysticism  maintains  the 
possibility  of  direct  intercourse  with  this  Being  of 

49  D 


50       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§25 

beings.  .  •  ♦    God  ceases  to  be  an  object  *  .  . 
and  becomes  an  experience/*  ^ 

Now  this  is  possible,  the  mystics  assert,  because, 
as  they  put  it,  not  only  is  there  a  sight  of  the  body, 
but  also  a  sight  of  the  soul.  The  soul,  if  its  eyes 
be  opened,  can  see ;  and  to  this  sight  is  God, 
immanent  in  man  and  in  nature,  most  gloriously 
visible.  The  outward  eye  beholds  only  the  things 
of  the  physical  realm :  the  inward  eye  of  the 
purified  mystic  perceives  their  spiritual  meaning 
and  the  hand  of  the  Divine  Author  of  nature 
everywhere  manifest. 

The  Ration-  §  26.  The  charge  that  Mysticism  is  opposed  to 
Mj^ticism  reason,  and  that  the  majority  of  the  mystics  have 
been  devotees  of  irrationality,  guided  only  by  their 
feelings,  is  an  unjust  one.  It  is  indeed  true  that, 
e*g.f  certain  of  the  mediaeval  mystics  of  the  Latin 
Church  were  not  free  from  an  unhealthy  emotional- 
ism, but  it  is  manifestly  unfair  to  blame  Mysticism 
for  the  faults  of  a  comparatively  few  mystics.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  it  would  be  more  true  to  say  of 
Mysticism  that  it  is  the  spirit  of  reason  in  religion — 

^Encyclopedia  Britannica,  nth.  ed.,  art.  "Mysticism,** 
Though  that  portion  of  Prof.  Pringle-Pattison's  definition  which 
I  have  quoted  above  is  quite  satisfactory,  it  is  only  fair  to  state 
that  Prof.  Pringle-Pattison's  attitude  is  hostile  to  Mysticism. 
Much  of  his  criticism,  however,  is  directed  against  what  has 
been  termed  "  the  negative  way,'*  which  is  really  a  perversion  of 
Mysticism. 


§26]  MYSTICISM  51 

not,  however,  a  cold,  formal  rationalism,  a  thing 
as  much  to  be  deplored  as  an  unhealthy  emotional- 
ism, but  a  spirit  of  rationality  in  which  the  heart 
joins  forces  with  the  head,  and  the  feelings  are 
given  due  place.  The  faith  of  the  mystic  is  not 
founded  upon  the  statements  of  other  men,  but  on 
the  facts  of  his  own  consciousness;  his  religion 
and  his  reason  are  indissolubly  united,  and  as 
Emerson  well  remarks :  **  When  all  is  said  and 
done,  the  rapt  saint  is  found  the  only  logician/*  • 
But  there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  nothing  so  alien  to 
the  spirit  of  Mysticism  as  intellectual  pride :  the 
mystic  bows  his  head  to  the  divine  revelation  and 
receives  with  meekness  divine  instruction,  for  he 
knows  that  God  is  not  divided  against  Himself, 
and  he  realises  that  reason  and  revelation  are  one. 
His  faith  in  the  glorious  revelation  of  the  Christ  is 
not  based  upon  the  assertions  of  other  men  that 
it  is  true  and  divine ;  and  the  rationality  of  his 
position  must  be  admitted,  for  the  mere  force  of 
an  assertion  is  no  criterion  of  its  truth,  nor  does 
the  truth  of  this  revelation  depend  upon  those 
historical  evidences,  which,  valuable  in  another 
way,  do  not  really  touch  the  kernel  of  the  matter. 
No !  the  mystic  has  faith  in  the  revelation  of  the 

*  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  :  The  Method  of  Nature  (sec  the 
edition  of  Emerson's  The  Conduct  of  Lift,  Nature  and  other 
Essays  in  Everyman's  Library,  edited  by  Ernest  Rhys,  p.  41). 


52       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§26 

Christ,  because  he  experiences  its  truth  in  his  own 
soul;  with  him,  faith  has  become  reason  and 
reason  is  turned  into  faith.  **  I  will  not  make  a 
Religion  for  God  :  nor  suffer  any  to  make  a 
Religion  for  me/*  ^  wrote  Benjamin  Whichcote; 
and  this  is  the  humble,  yet  independent,  attitude 
of  every  great  mystic. 

Views  of  the  §  27*  Of  course,  it  can  well  be  understood  that 
Platonists*'  such  an  attitude  could  not  comfortably  exist 
within  the  Latin  Church,  and  it  is  a  matter  of 
historical  fact  that  Rome  has  never  regarded 
Mysticism  with  a  favourable  eye  :  she  has  barely 
tolerated  in  her  fold  any  Mysticism  other  than  an 
emasculated  variety  in  which  a  blind  following  of 
so-called  **  spiritual  directors  ** — men  in  authority 
in  the  Church — is  substituted  for  the  belief  that  the 
light  of  God  within  the  mind,  manifesting  itself 
in  an  enlightened  reason  and  a  free  conscience,  is 
the  true  guide  in  the  life  of  the  Christian  mystic. 
Ruysbroeck,  perhaps,  affords  an  exception  to  this, 
and  one  or  two  other  cases  may  possibly  be  instanced. 
Speaking  generally,  however,  we  must  look  else- 
where for  the  free  spirit  of  true  Mysticism — 
amongst  those  early  Greek  Christian  theologians, 

»  Benjamin  Whichcote  :  Moral  and  Religious  Aphorisms 
(See  The  Cambridge  Platonists,  being  Selections  from  the  Writings 
of  Benjamin  Whichcote,  John  Smith,  and  Nathanael  Ctdverwel, 
with  Introduction  by  E,  T,  Campagnac,  M»A.,  1901,  p.  67). 


§37]  MYSTICISM  53 

who  so  advantageously  combined  the  philosophy 
of  Plato  with  the  religion  of  Christ ;  or  amongst 
the  later  mystics  of  Protestant  times*  Possibly, 
nowhere  else  (with  the  exception  of  the  writings 
of  Swedenborg)  shall  we  find  the  excellency  of 
true  Reason,  and  its  perfect  harmony  with  Divine 
Revelation,  so  emphasised  as  in  the  works  of  that 
seventeenth-century  school  of  mystical  divines 
(particularly  Whichcote  and  Smith),  called  **  Lati- 
tudinarians  **  by  their  opponents,  to  whom  their 
broad-minded  spirit  was  displeasing,  but  now 
generally  known  as  the  **  Cambridge  Platonists/' 
Writes  Whichcote  to  Tuckney,  **  I  oppose  not 
rational  to  spiritual,  for  spiritual  is  most  rational*';* 
and  again,  in  his  discourse  on  The  Work  of  Reason, 
he  remarks  :  **  Man  is  not  at  all  settled  or  con- 
firmed in  his  Religion,  until  his  Religion  is  the 
self-same  with  the  Reason  of  his  Mind ;  that 
when  he  thinks  he  speaks  Reason,  he  speaks 
Religion  ;  or  when  he  speaks  religiously,  he  speaks 
reasonably ;  and  his  Religion  and  Reason  is 
mingled  together ;  they  pass  into  one  Principle ; 
they  are  no  more  two,  but  one  :  just  as  the  light 
in  the  Air  makes  one  illuminated  Sphere;  so 
Reason  and  Religion  in  the  Subject,  are  one  prin- 
ciple/' ^  Or  as  Smith  puts  it :  **  It's  a  fond 
imagination  that  Religion  should  extinguish 
*  Sec  The  Cambridge  Platomsts,  p.  7a^nL  •  lb,  p.  55. 


54       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§37 

Reason ;  whenas  Religion  makes  it  more  illus- 
trious and  vigorous  ;  and  they  that  live  most  in  the 
exercise  of  Religion,  shall  find  their  Reason  most 
enlarged/'  *  Reason,  the  Cambridge  Platonists 
rightly  taught,  is  the  very  voice  of  God  in  the  soul 
of  man,  and  through  it  he  may  attain  to  a  knowledge 
of  Divine  Truth*  This,  however,  is  not  said  of 
the  perverted  reason  of  the  sinful  man  who  is 
bound  by  the  things  of  sense  ;  but  of  the  genuine 
reason  of  the  virtuous  soul,  illumined  by  the  light 
from  the  Source  of  all  right  Reason  ♦  **  Reason 
discovers  what  is  Natural ;  **  writes  Whichcote, 
**  and  Reason  receives  what  is  Supernatural/' ' 
Or  as  Culverwel  (another  of  the  same  school) 
writes  :  **  'Tis  God,  that  plants  Reason,  'tis  he, 
that  waters  it,  'tis  he,  that  gives  it  an  increase/*  ^ 

John  Smith,  who  greatly  developed  Whichcote's 
ideas,  and  is  the  clearest  and  most  idealistic  thinker 
of  the  whole  school,  definitely  identified  the  purified 
and  enlightened  reason  with  the  sight  of  the  soul, 
and  has  much  of  value  on  this  point  in  his  delight- 
ful Discourse  concerning  the  True  Way  or  Method 
of  Attaining  to  Divine  Knowledge,  from  which  I 

•  John  Smith  :  The  Excellency  and  Nobleness  of  True  Religion 
(i6,p.i86), 

»  Benjamin  Whichcote  :  Moral  and  Religious  Aphorisms 
{ib*  p»  67). 

•  Nathanael  Culverwel  :  An  Elegant  and  Learned  Discourse 
of  the  Light  of  Nature  {ib*  p.  293). 


§37]  MYSTICISM  55 

quote  the  following  passages,  since  the  ideas 
expressed  in  them  are  so  essentially  true  of  all 
genuine  Mysticism  : — **  Were  I  indeed  to  define 
Divinity,**  he  writes,  *'  I  should  rather  call  it  a 
Divine  life,  then  a  Divine  science  ;  it  being  some- 
thing rather  to  be  understood  by  a  Spiritual  sensa- 
tion, then  by  any  Verbal  description,  as  all  things  of 
Sense  and  Life  are  best  known  by  Sentient  and 
Vital  faculties*  .  ♦  ♦  Every  thing  is  best  known  by 
that  which  bears  a  just  resemblance  and  analogie 
with  it :  and  therefore  the  Scripture  is  wont  to  set 
forth  a  Good  life  as  the  Prolepsis  and  Fundamental 
principle  of  Divine  Science*  .  ♦  ♦ 

**  To  seek  our  Divinity  meerly  in  Books  and 
Writings  is  to  seek  the  living  among  the  dead  :  we 
doe  but  in  vain  seek  God  many  times  in  these, 
where  his  Truth  too  often  is  not  so  much  enshrin*d, 
as  entomb* d:  no;  intra  te  quasre  Deum,  seek  for 
God  within  thine  own  soul ;  he  is  best  discerned 
vo€p^  kira<j>-Q,  as  Plotinus  phraseth  it,  by  an  Intel- 
lectual touch  of  him :  we  must  see  with  our  eyes, 
and  hear  with  our  ears,  and  our  hands  must  handle 
the  word  of  life,  that  I  may  express  it  in  S»  John*s 
words*  "EcTTi  Kttt  j/'vx^s  aia-d-qa-is  Tts,  The  Soul  it  self 
hath  its  sense,  as  well  as  the  Body  :  and  therefore 
David,  when  he  would  teach  us  how  to  know 
what  the  Divine  Goodness  is,  calls  not  for  Specu- 
lation but  Sensation,  fast  and  see  how  good  the 


56       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§27 

Lord  is.  That  is  not  the  best  and  truest  know- 
ledge of  God  which  is  wrought  out  by  the  labour 
and  sweat  of  the  Brain,  but  that  which  is  kindled 
within  us  by  an  heavenly  warmth  in  our  Hearts,  ♦  ♦  ♦ 
**  But  how  sweet  and  delicious  that  Truth  is 
which  holy  and  heaven-born  Souls  feed  upon  in 
their  mysterious  converses  with  the  Deity,  who  can 
tell  but  they  that  tast  its'  When  Reason  once 
is  raised  by  the  mighty  force  of  the  Divine  Spirit 
into  a  converse  with  God,  it  is  turned  into  Sense  : 
That  which  before  was  onely  Faith  well  built  upon 
sure  Principles,  (for  such  our  Science  may  be)  now 
becomes  Vision*  We  shall  then  converse  with 
God  r(^  vf ,  whereas  before  we  conversed  with 
him  only  t^  Stavota,  with  our  Discursive  faculty, 
as  the  Platonists  were  wont  to  distinguish/*  * 

The  Nature  §  28,  *'  Mysticism,**  wrote  the  late  C,  C,  Massey, 
o  ntuition  *i  ^g  ^  peculiar  vital  apprehension  of  spiritual  prin- 
ciples and  energies,  and  of  their  functional  opera- 
tions in  or  through  man  and  nature  ♦  It  claims  a 
certitude  analogous  to  that  of  sensible  experience, 
and  usually  designated  *  intuitional/  Thought, 
in  whatever  province  it  is  exercised,  seeks  to 
recover  for  consciousness  the  synthesis  of  its 
related  elements;  'intuition*  gives  this  synthesis 
immediately,  and  is  a  direct  perception  of  truth  in 
*  Ib»  pp.  80,  81  and  93. 


§29]  MYSTICISM  57 

an  organic  and  concrete  unity/'  ^  If  we  use  the 
term  **  reason  ''  merely  for  the  method  of  deductive 
logic,  then  it  is  true  that  intuition,  that  is,  the  sight 
of  the  soul,  claims  to  transcend  reason  as  a  method 
of  obtaining  truth,  though  not  (apart  from  the  fact 
that  deductive  logic  is  necessarily  limited  by  the 
premises  at  hand)  in  its  results.  In  the  truer  use 
of  the  term  **  reason,*'  however,  as  connoting,  in 
Dean  Inge's  words,  **  the  logic  of  the  whole  person- 
ality," this  is  not  true  ;  for  the  real  contrast  is  not 
between  intuition  and  reason,  but  between  in- 
tuition and  outward  sight,  with  the  logic  that  is 
based  thereon.  Intuition  is,  indeed,  not  mere 
sensuous  reason,  neither  is  it  irrational  feeling,  but 
a  synthesis  of  the  highest  reason  and  the  highest 
feeling,  in  which  spiritual  truth  is  experienced  as  a 
living  fact. 

§  29.  That  **  intuition  "  is  a  real  power  of  the  Intuition 
soul  is  not  only  the  assertion  of  all  genuine 
Mysticism,  but  is  attested  by  all  that  is  truly 
valuable  in  Art,  for  all  genuine  Art  is  the  manipula- 
tion of  the  symbols  of  nature  and  experience  so 
that  their  spiritual  meaning  may  be  blazoned  forth  ; 
and  this  can  be  accomplished  only  in  virtue  of  a 
perception  (whether  conscious  or  sub-conscious) 

*•  Thoughts  of  a  Modern  Mystic  :  a  Selection  from  the  Writings 
of  the  late  C,  C.  Massey,  edited  by  Prof.  W.  F.  Barrett,  F.R.S. 
(1909),  p.  136. 


58       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§29 

of  this  meaning  by  the  artist  who  manipulates  them. 
To  this  extent  all  genuine  artists  must  also  be 
mystics  :  they  must  behold  the  vision — the  vision 
of  God  in  the  soul,  of  the  spiritual  in  the  natural ; 
else  they  cannot  give  of  the  fruits  of  this  vision  to 
humanity  at  large.  As  to  Wordsworth,  so  to  him 
who  would  be  true  artist,  there  must  come — 

**  A  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused. 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns. 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air. 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man ; 
A  motion  and  a  spirit,  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thoughts. 
And  rolls  through  all  things/' 

He  must  experience  that  **  blessed  mood  ** — 

"  In  which  the  affections  gently  lead  us  on, — 
Until,  the  breath  of  this  corporeal  frame 
And  even  the  motion  of  our  human  blood 
Almost  suspended,  we  are  laid  asleep 
In  body,  and  become  a  living  soul : 
While  with  an  eye  made  quiet  by  the  power 
Of  harmony,  and  the  deep  power  of  joy. 
We  see  into  the  life  of  things.** " 

Visions  and        §  30,  J  have  spoken  of  the  inward  consciousness 
The  Vision  .  .  . 

of  spiritual  truth  given  by  the  intuitive  power  of 

the  soul  as  vision,  and  thus  is  it  rightly  denominated 

as  an  immediate  perception  of  Divine  verity.    But 

"  From  the  well-known  Lines  composed  a  few  Miles  abov$ 
Tintern  Abbey,  1798. 


§30]  MYSTICISM  59 

generally  the  term  '*  vision  **  has  a  somewhat 
different  significance,  and  is  used  to  denote  such 
experiences  as  those  of  Suso,  of  whom  we  read 
that  he  beheld  Mary  and  her  Holy  Child  and  knelt 
himself  in  adoration,  and  of  the  many  other 
mystics  who  have  claimed  to  have  seen  the  forms 
of  angelical  beings.  Such  visions  may  be  usefully 
distinguished  from  the  inward  perception  of 
spiritual  truth.  The  desire  for  the  inward  en- 
lightenment of  the  soul,  for  the  guidance  of  the 
Spirit  in  mind  and  heart,  is  one  of  which  all  must 
approve  and  to  which  all  ought  to  aspire  ;  but  the 
longing  for  visions,  during  this  earthly  life,  of  the 
inhabitants  of  spiritual  realms,  or  of  our  Divine 
Saviour  as  He  appeared  on  earth, — which  is  a  wish 
for  **  form  **  rather  than  **  substance  **  with  respect 
to  spiritual  verity,  for  externality  rather  than  spirit, 
— to  say  nothing  of  the  attempt  to  produce  such 
visions  by  artificial  means,  generally,  if  not  always, 
proves  psychologically  disastrous ;  and  was,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  universally  condemned  by  the  great 
Christian  mystics  of  the  past.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  I  think  that  no  fundamental  distinction, 
no  hard  and  fast  line  of  demarcation  should  be 
drawn  between  the  two  types  of  vision  as  actually 
experienced.  Spontaneous  visions  of  spiritual 
beings  may  be  as  genuine  and  as  much  the  result  of 
the  sight  of  the  soul  as  the  interior  perception  of 


6o       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§30 

Divine  truth,  for  such  visions  may  be  given  to  man 
by  God,  but  only  when  they  have  a  mission  of 
Truth  to  telL  Truth  is  still,  in  itself,  one  and  the 
same,  though  it  may  be  expressed  in  various  forms, 
or  in  a  manner  that  almost  transcends  forms,  save 
in  the  most  spiritual  sense  of  the  term ;  a  vision 
may  still  be  true,  and  therefore  real — in  an  objec- 
tive sense, — even  though  expressed  in  a  symboHc 
manner. 

Visions  Non-     §  31^  But  this,  of  course,  can  by  no  means  be 

essential  to  ^        .      r     11  i        •  •  t    j      .       1 

Mysticism     asserted  of  all  such  visions ♦    Indeed,  the  great 

mystics  have  always  recognised  the  fact  that  visions, 

apparently   of   spiritual   beings,    may   be    quite 

illusory,  and  they  have  never  assigned  to  them  any 

such  importance  as  one  would  gather  from  some  of 

the  statements  of  Mysticism's  opponents.    Such 

phenomena,  then,  whatever  their  value,  are  to  be 

classed  amongst  the  non-essentials  so  far  as  the  claim 

to  the  title  of  mystic  is  concerned.    The  cautious 

attitude  of  Fenelon  in  his  Maxims  of  the  Saints  is 

largely  characteristic  of  the  great  Christian  mystics. 

He  writes,  **  In  the  history  of  inward  experience, 

we  not  unfrequently  find  accounts  of  individuals 

whose  inward  life  may  properly  be  characterized 

as  extraordinary.    They  represent  themselves  as 

having  extraordinary  communications  ; — dreams, 

visions,  revelations.    Without  stopping  to  inquire 


§  31  ]  MYSTICISM  6i 

whether  these  inward  results  arise  from  an  excited 
and  disordered  state  of  the  physical  system  or  from 
God,  the  important  remark  to  be  made  here  is, 
that  these  things,  to  whatever  extent  they  may 
exist,  do  not  constitute  holiness. 

**  The  principle,  which  is  the  life  of  common 
Christians  in  their  common  fixed  state,  is  the  prin- 
ciple which  originates  and  sustains  the  life  of  those 
who  are  truly  *  the  pure  in  heart,*  namely,  the  prin- 
ciple of  faith  working  by  love, — existing,  however, 
in  the  case  of  those  last  mentioned,  in  a  greatly 
increased  degree.  ♦  .  ♦ 

*'  Again,  the  persons  who  have,  or  are  supposed 
to  have,  the  visions  and  other  remarkable  states  to 
which  we  have  referred,  are  sometimes  disposed 
to  make  their  own  experience,  imperfect  as  it 
obviously  is,  the  guide  of  their  life,  considered  as 
separate  from  and  as  above  the  written  law.  Great 
care  should  be  taken  against  such  an  error  as  this. 
God's  word  is  our  true  rule. 

**  Nevertheless,**  Fenelon  continues,  **  there  is 
no  interpreter  of  the  Divine  Word  like  that  of  a 
holy  heart ;  or,  what  is  the  same  thing,  of  the  Holy 
Ghost  dwelling  in  the  heart.  If  we  give  ourselves 
wholly  to  God,  the  Comforter  will  take  up  His 
abode  with  us,  and  guide  us  into  all  that  truth  which 
will  be  necessary  for  us.  Truly  holy  souls,  there- 
fore, continually  looking  to  God  for  a  proper  under- 


63       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§31 

standing  of  His  word,  may  confidently  trust  that 
He  will  guide  them  aright*  A  holy  soul,  in  the 
exercise  of  its  legitimate  powers  of  interpretation, 
may  deduce  important  views  from  the  Word  of 
God  which  would  not  otherwise  be  known ;  but 
it  cannot  add  anything  to  it/* " 

S"i>i«ctive         §  32.  Before   proceeding  further  with  a  dis- 

and  Objective  . 

Visions         cussion  of  seership,  I  would  remind  the  reader  of 

the  conclusions  regarding  the  nature  of  "  sub- 
jective **  and  **  objective  **  reality  reached  in 
Part  L  In  accordance  with  these  conclusions,  a 
**  subjective  **  vision  may  be  defined  as  one  which 
is  true  only  for  its  percipient ;  an  **  objective  " 
vision  as  one  which  is  true  universally.  The 
snakes  of  delirium  tremens  are  in  the  first  category 
{i.e.t  that  of  subjective  visions),  and  we  rightly 
say  that  the  dipsomaniac  is  deluded,  because  the 
terrible  objects  he  beholds,  although  perfectly  real 
for  him,  are  non-existent  so  far  as  the  normal 
man  is  concerned  :  in  other  words,  they  exist  only 
in  the  mind  or  imagination  of  the  sufferer.  On  the 
other  hand,  when  the  Psalmist  declares  that  **  The 
earth  is  the  Lord^s,  and  the  fullness  thereof,**  ^^  we 
rightly  say,  not  that  he  is  deluded,  but  that  he  is 

*•  Archbishop  FiNELON:  The  Maxims  of  the  Saints  (AUenson's 
"  Heart  and  Life  **  Booklets,  No.  i6,  pp.  i6  and  17). 
^'  Psalm  xxiv.  verse  i. 


§32]  MYSTICISM  63 

inspired  ;  for  his  vision  is  true  not  only  for  him- 
self, but  for  all  men  who  can  see  aright :  it  exists 
not  only  in  his  mind  but  in  the  Mind  of  God, 
Between  these  two  extremes  lie  visions  of  every 
degree  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity ;  visions, 
more  or  less  truth-telling,  more  or  less  symbolic, 
in  which  both  elements  are  blended  together  in 
varying  proportions.  **  One  must  bear  in  re- 
membrance,'* says  Fiona  Macleod,  in  lona,  **  that, 
in  spiritual  sight,  there  is  symbolic  vision  as  well 
as  actual  vision*  When  G^lum  ♦  ♦  .  hurried  for- 
ward to  minister  to  an  old  dying  Pict  *  who  had 
lived  well  by  the  hght  of  nature,*  and  whose  house, 
condition,  and  end  had  been  suddenly  revealed 
to  him :  then  we  have  actual  vision  ♦  When 
Aithn6,  his  mother,  dreamed  that  an  angel  showed 
her  a  garment  of  so  surpassing  a  loveliness  that  it 
was  as  though  woven  of  flowers  and  rainbows, 
and  then  threw  it  on  high,  till  its  folds  expanded 
and  covered  every  mountain-top  from  the  brows 
of  Connaught  to  the  feet  of  the  Danish  Sea,  and 
so  revealed  to  her  what  manner  of  son  she  bore 
within  her  womb  ,  .  .  then  we  have  symbohc 
vision.  And  sometimes  we  have  that  which  par- 
takes of  each,  as  when  .  •  ♦  G)lum  saw  angels 
standing  upon  the  rocks  on  the  opposite  side  of 
the  Sound  which  divides  lona  from  the  Ross  of 
Mull,  calling  to  his  soul  to  cross  to  them,  yet,  as 


64       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§32 

they  assembled  and  beckoned,  mysteriously  and 
suddenly  restrained,  for  his  hour  was  not  come/' 

Relativity  of  §  33*  Now,  a  man's  percepts  of  the  things  of 
Experience  the  material  world  depend  as  much  upon  his 
physical  sense-organs  as  upon  the  things  sensed, 
ue*,  there  are  laws  of  nature  connecting  all  these 
phenomena.  His  percepts  depend  also  upon  the 
conditions  under  which  observation  is  made.  To 
confine  our  attention  to  one  sense-organ,  say  that 
of  sight,  we  know  that  the  appearance  of  objects 
depends  very  largely  upon  the  condition  of  the  eye, 
and  its  sensitiveness  to  the  rays  of  hght,  as  well  as 
upon  the  nature  of  the  light  in  which  observation 
is  made.  There  is  no  departure  from  Idealism 
in  asserting  this,  because,  as  we  have  seen,  (objec- 
tive) truth  concerning  the  physical  realm  resides 
in  the  relations  between  our  ideas  of  sensation 
rather  than  in  the  ideas  themselves.  We  have 
seen  that  it  is  impossible  to  determine  whether 
my  **  red  *'  is  identical  with  yours  ;  but  in  the  case 
of  certain  persons  it  is  abundantly  evident  that  the 
red  of  one  is  not  the  same  as  the  red  of  another. 
Colour-blindness,  in  one  variety  of  which,  red  is 
not  distinguished  from  green,  but  both  appear 
identical  with  grey,  is  a  case  in  point.  And  this 
defect  is  always  associated  with  certain  peculiarities 
in  the  structure  of  the  eyes  of  the  persons  afflicted 


§34]  MYSTICISM  65 

with  it.  But  the  person  suffering  from  this  form 
of  colour-blindness,  though  he  cannot  have  distinct 
sense-ideas  of  red  and  green,  can  still  be  convinced 
that  there  is  an  objectively  real  relation,  and  hence 
distinction,  denoted  by  the  words. 

§  34.  From  facts  like  these  we  might,  by  analogy.  Relativity  of 
conclude  that  a  similar  principle  of  relativity  holds  Experience 
good  in  the  case  of  spiritual  perception,  spiritual 
verities  appearing  different  according  to  the  con- 
dition of  the  soul  or  state  of  mind  of  him  who 
perceives.  We  are  not,  however,  left  to  depend 
merely  upon  analogy  for  this  conclusion ;  that  it 
is  a  fact  is  in  many  ways  abundantly  evident. 
Thus,  both  the  true  scientist  and  the  true  artist 
perceive  a  fundamental  unity  or  harmony  under- 
lying the  apparent  multiplicity  of  natural  pheno- 
mena, and  the  unity  of  which  they  are  conscious 
is  essentially  one  and  the  same ;  but  it  appears, 
speaking  generally,  under  quite  different  forms  in 
the  two  cases.  Or,  to  take  a  somewhat  different 
example,  we  have  evidence  of  the  same  principle  of 
relativity  in  spiritual  perception,  in  the  fact  that, 
whilst  a  good  man  sees  moral  truth  as  it  really  is. 
I.e.,  as  it  exists  in  the  Mind  of  Gk)d,  an  evil  man 
beholds  all  spiritual  things  inverted  —  to  him, 
falsities  appear  as  truths,  and  evil  things  as  good 
and  greatly  to  be  desired. 


66       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§35 

ThcEmo-         §  35^  It  will  be  generally  admitted  that  the 
tional  Tern-  ,        .  ^      .    ,  .  , .     ,       . 

perament       emotional  type  of  mmd  is  one  exceedingly  given  to 

beholding  things  in  a  wrong  perspective,  of  tinc- 
turing its  percepts,  as  it  were,  with  the  colours  of 
its  own  nature*    The  emotional  type  of  mind,  more 
than  any  other,  projects  itself  into  the  things  upon 
which  it  gazes,  not  infrequently  distorting  and 
exaggerating  certain  aspects  of  the  same.    Now,  it 
is  very  largely  mystics  of  a  rather  emotional  type 
of  mind  that  claim  to  have  experienced  visions  of 
angelical  beings  and  other  visions  of  this  type  : 
the  more  purely  intellectual  mystics  do  not  as  a  rule 
assert  that  they  have  been  vouchsafed  experiences 
of  this  nature.    This  is  easy  to  understand,  if  it  be 
admitted,  and  I  think  it  must  be  admitted,  that, 
whilst  there  is  an  objective  spiritual  verity  under- 
lying many  such  visions,  their  form  is  largely  sub- 
jective and  derived  from  the  seer's  own  stock  of 
ideas.    This  seems  to  be  the  most  satisfactory 
theory  regarding  the  nature  of  the  majority  of  such 
of  these  visions  as  can  be  called  genuine.    They 
possessed  a  reality  for  the  percipients  beyond  that 
which  they  can  have  for  us  ;  by  which  I  mean,  not 
that  they  may  not  have  had  their  origin  in  objective 
spiritual  verity,  but  that  the  relation  between  this 
objective   reahty  and   the  vision   as  it  actually 
appeared  to  the  seer  was  one  depending  upon  his 
mental  nature;    with  the  result  that,  in  many 


§36]  MYSTICISM  67 

cases,  the  form  of  such  visions  is  largely  symbolical 
and  even  fantastically  so, 

§  36,  There  are  further  considerations,  however.  Causation 
which  may  cause  us  to  place  a  not  inconsiderable  Metaphysics 
number  of  so-called  visions  of  spiritual  beings  in  °^  Source 
what  may  be  termed  a  lower  category.  No 
genuinely  idealistic  system  of  philosophy  can  admit 
the  possibility  of  physical  causation  —  using  the 
term  **  causation  *^  in  its  strictest  meaning,  and  not 
simply  as  implying  mere  concomitance  in  time  or 
place.  But  that  there  is  apparent  causation  of  this 
nature,  that  the  things  of  the  spiritual  or  mental 
world  are  not  wholly  unaffected  by  the  things  of 
the  material  world,  is  most  evident.  It  is  evident, 
for  example,  from  the  fact  of  sensation  itself.  As 
Berkeley  shows  us,  ideas  do  not  cause  one  another, 
they  merely  succeed  one  another.  Spirit  alone  is 
active,  and  is  the  cause  of  ideas,  which  are  passive. 
The  fire  is  not  the  cause  of  the  burning  pain  I 
experience  if  I  plunge  my  hand  into  it ;  it  is  merely 
the  sign  that  I  shall  experience  this  pain  if  I  act 
in  this  manner.  The  motion  of  one  body  is  never 
the  cause  of  the  motion  of  another,  though  it  may 
be  its  antecedent.  Or,  as  Swedenborg  puts  the 
same  truth,  **  Whatever  exists  in  the  form  of  an 
effect  proceeds  from  a  cause,  that  which  does  not 
proceed  from  a  cause  being  separated.    Such  is 


68       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§36 

the  case  with  nature ;  all  the  individual  and  par- 
ticular objects  belonging  to  it  arc  effects  from  a 
cause,  which  is  prior,  interior,  and  superior  to  it, 
and  which  proceeds  immediately  from  God.  For 
since  there  exists  a  spiritual  world,  which  is  prior, 
interior,  and  superior  to  the  natural  world,  there- 
fore all  that  belongs  to  the  former  is  cause,  and  all 
that  belongs  to  the  latter  is  effect.  The  existence 
indeed  of  one  thing  from  another  is  also  progres- 
sive in  the  natural  world,  but  this  is  by  means  of 
causes  proceeding  from  the  spiritual  world ;  for 
where  the  cause  of  an  effect  is,  there  also  is  to  be 
found  the  cause  of  an  efficient  effect.  For  every 
effect  becomes  an  efficient  cause  in  successive 
order,  even  to  the  ultimate,  where  the  effective 
force  stops »  But  this  is  continually  accomplished 
from  the  Spiritual  in  which  alone  this  force  exists ; 
this  therefore  is  the  reason  why  nothing  in  nature 
exists  except  from  the  Spiritual,  and  by  means  of 
it.**  ^*  We  see,  therefore,  that,  although  all  causa- 
tion is  by  and  from  the  spiritual,  yet,  since  natural 
phenomena  always  succeed  one  another  in  definite 
and  fixed  orders,  since  they  are  progressive,  they 
exhibit  a  semblance  of  causation.  Indeed,  for  the 
purely  practical  purposes  of  science  and  daily  life, 
as  distinguished  from  the  needs  of  Metaphysics, 

1*  Emanuel  Swedenborg  :  God,  Providence,  Creation  (trans, 
by  I.  Tanslcy,  1902),  §  94* 


§36]  MYSTICISM  69 

we  may  speak  of  one  phenomenon  as  the  cause  of 
another.  ],  S.  Mill,  for  example,  defined  the 
"  cause  **  of  a  phenomenon  as  those  phenomena 
which  are  always  and  unconditionally  observed  to 
precede  it ;  ^  and  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the  word  is 
generally  employed  in  scientific  text-books.  There 
is  no  harm  in  this,  so  long  as  it  is  borne  in  mind  that 
the  word  **  cause  **  thus  defined  has  quite  a  different 
meaning  from  its  metaphysical  one  of  **  source,'' 
which  is  based  upon  our  consciousness  of  will  and 
our  felt  power  to  produce  effects  in  the  external 
world.  Mill,  with  his  usual  care  and  logic,  called 
attention  to  this,  and  stated  that  what  he  was 
dealing  with  were  **  physical ''  and  not  **  efficient 
causes  ** ;  unfortunately,  however,  this  most 
important  distinction  is  often  lost  sight  of,  and 
unfortunately  also,  Mill  denied  the  doctrine  that 
volition  is  an  **  efficient  cause,*'  and  sought  to 
bring  the  phenomena  of  will  and  desire  under  the 
category  of  **  physical  causation."  The  fact  of 
Purpose,  however, — the  existence  of  the  effect  in 
the  realm  of  Imagination  before  its  existence  in 
that  of  Nature,  or  sensation, — serves  sharply  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  relation  of  volition  to  its 
effect,  and  that  of  a  **  physical  cause  "  (**  in- 
variably   and    unconditionally    antecedent    phe- 

*•  See  the  Section  on  the  **  Law  of  Universal  Causation  "  m 
bis  System  of  Logic* 


70       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§36 

nomenon  ")  to  its  '*  effect  '*  (or,  rather,  **  conse- 
quent '*),  and  it  is  to  the  existence  of  Purpose  that 
the  first  relation  owes  its  epistemologically  satis- 
factory nature.  Only  when  the  end  or  purpose 
has  been  discovered  can  the  mind  rest  from  its 
search,  and  since  the  concept  of  End  or  Purpose 
has  no  meaning  as  applied  to  **  physical  causation,** 
the  mind  is  compelled  to  postulate  an  **  efficient 
cause  ** — a  Will — behind  every  process  of  **  physi- 
cal causation/* 

Asceticism  §  37.  As  concems  the  causation  of  sensation, 
Dangers  Swedenborg  maintains  that  there  is  influx  from 
the  spiritual  to  the  natural,  from  which  the  latter 
derives  its  existence,  but  not  conversely.  In  man, 
who  has  no  life  or  truth  in  himself,  but  is  a  recipient 
of  life  and  truth  from  God,  this  influx  is  modified 
according  to  the  condition  of  the  sense-organs ; 
and  thus  arises  sensation.  Indeed,  it  is  most 
evident  that,  whilst  incarnated,  our  natural  bodies 
are  not  negligible  factors  in  our  spiritual  Hves ; 
and  I  venture  to  suggest  that  it  will  be  nowise  a 
departure  from  a  sane  Idealism,  to  maintain  that 
an  unhealthy  and  unnatural  condition  of  the 
physical  body  is  very  liable  to  give  rise  to  visions  of 
an  entirely  delusive  nature.  That  many  recorded 
experiences  of  alleged  appearances  of  spiritual 
beings  were  of  this  type  is  a  fact  that  was  by  no 


§38]  MYSTICISM  fi 

means  unrecognised  by  the  great  mystics  of  the 
past.  As  to  asceticism/'  it  must  suffice  here  to 
remark:  (L)  That  it  was  largely  practised  in  an 
extreme  form  by  many  of  the  mediaeval  mystics 
of  the  Latin  Church  {e.g*,  Suso) ;  (iL)  That  since 
(Hke  the  opposite  evil,  vi2;.,  debauchery)  it  is  con- 
trary to  Nature,  which  true  Mysticism  declares  is 
the  expression  and  manifestation  of  the  Divine 
Mind,  it  must  inevitably  result  in  unhealthiness  and 
an  unnatural  state  of  the  physical  man : — two  facts 
which  warn  us  to  be  extremely  cautious  of  setting 
too  high  a  value  upon  the  visions  of  many  of  the 
Roman  Catholic  mystics.  And,  of  course,  the 
same  caution  is  necessary  in  dealing  with  the  alleged 
visions  of  other  mystics,  such  as  those  of  the  East, 
given  to  extremes  of  asceticism. 

§  38.  Moreover,  in  discussing  this  question  we  The  Sub- 
must  take  into  account  the  workings  of  the  sub-  Self  and  its 
conscious  self.    There  cannot,  I  think,  be  much  P^°^"<=^ 
doubt  that  many  of  the  so-called   visions  and 
auditions  of  modem  clairvoyants  and  clairaudients 
(that  is,  of  those  who  are  not  in  the  category  of 
deliberate  cheats  and  impostors)  are  merely  the 

»•  For  some  further  remarks  by  the  present  writer  on  this 
subject  see  a  short  article  in  Morning  Light  for  August, 
1910  (Vol.  xxxiii.,  pp.  330-333),  entitled  **  On  Pleasure  and 
Asceticism." 


73       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§38 

products  of  their  subconscious  selves;  and  no 
doubt  the  same  holds  good  of  some  of  the  visions  of 
the  mystics  of  the  past»  Of  course,  it  may  be  said 
that  all  visions  are  the  products  of  the  subconscious 
self,  the  sight  of  the  soul  being  a  **  faculty  **  of  that 
self*  My  present  reference,  however,  is  not  to 
visions  arising  through  the  perception  of  objective 
spiritual  verity  by  means  of  a  subconscious  power, 
but  to  those  pseudo-visions  whose  whole  substance, 
as  well  as  their  form,  is  derived  from  the  subcon- 
scious self*  A  modern  case  of  this  sort  is  recorded 
in  a  book  published  in  1909  under  the  title  of  The 
Maniac,  a  work  purporting  to  be  a  study  of  acute 
mania  from  the  standpoint  of  the  sufferer  —  a 
woman-journalist  in  this  case*  The  voices  which 
she  heard,  and  which  she  treated  as  emanating  from 
spirits  other  than  herself,  were,  as  she  realised 
upon  her  recovery,  due  to  fragments  of  her  own 
subconscious  self  which  had  acquired  personalities 
of  their  own — the  result :  dissociation  of  person- 
ality, that  is,  madness*  The  case  of  August 
Strindberg  may  also  be  mentioned  here*  He  did 
not  claim  to  see  visions,  but  at  a  certain  period  in 
his  life  natural  objects  began  to  take  on  a  new  and, 
as  it  seemed,  prophetic  meaning  to  him*  Coin- 
cidences were  always  occurring,  seemingly  to 
direct  his  life,  and  whose  suggestions  he  always 
followed ;    until  he  found  himself  the  victim  of 


§40]  MYSTICISM  73 

paranoia  (persecutory  mania)  ♦  "  Indeed,  the 
chronicles  of  madness  are  full  of  such  cases,  which 
warn  us  to  be  careful  in  dealing  with  this  subject. 

§  39.  But  after  making  all  due  allowances  for  the  Conclusions 
factors  which  produce  delusion,  there  does  remain  value  of 
a  by  no  means  unimportant  residuum  of  cases  ^^*°"* 
which  prove  that  to  some  souls  have  been  vouch- 
safed visions  of  angelic  beings  {Le.,  **  the  spirits 
of  just  men  made  perfect  **)  and  of  the  spiritual 
world  :   and  the  materialistic  contention  that  all 
such  experiences  have  their  origin  in  disease  either 
of  mind  or  body  is  as  untenable  as  the  credulous 
belief  that  none  are  of  this  nature. 

§  40.  The    seership    of    Jacob    Boehme,    the  The  Testi- 
inspired  shoemaker  of  Goerlitz,  calls  for  special  jacob 
mention.    Boehme  claimed,  not  to  have  beheld  ^^^^^ 
and  conversed  with  spirits  or  angels,  but  to  have 
seen  into  the  inmosts  of  Nature.    He  tells  us  that 
he  never  desired  that  any  such  mighty  mysteries 
should  be  revealed  to  him  ;  but  **  as  it  is  the  con- 
dition of  poor  laymen  in  their  simplicity,"  he 
writes,  **  I  sought  only  after  the  heart  of  Jesus 

^'  See  in  particular  his  The  Inferno  (trans,  by  C.  Field,  1912). 
Strindberg  himself  attributed  his  recovery  from  madness  to 
Swedenborg,  whose  works  he  read  in  his  latter  days*  He 
interpreted  some  of  Swedenborg's  doctrines,  however,  in  a 
rather  unusual  manner. 


74       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§40 

Christ  •  .  .  and  I  besought  the  Lord  earnestly 
for  His  holy  spirit,  and  His  grace,  that  He  would  be 
pleased  to  bless  and  guide  me  in  Him ;  and  take 
that  away  from  me,  which  did  turn  me  away  from 
Him,  and  I  resigned  myself  wholly  to  Him,  that  I 
might  not  live  to  my  own  will,  but  to  His  ;  and  that 
He  only  might  lead  and  direct  me:  to  the  end, 
that  I  might  be  His  child  in  His  Son  Jesus  Christ* 

**  In  this  my  earnest  Christian  seeking  and 
desire,**  he  continues,  *'  the  gate  was  opened  unto 
me,  that  in  one  quarter  of  an  hour  I  saw  and  knew 
more  than  if  I  had  been  many  years  together 
at  an  University ;  at  which  I  did  exceedingly 
admire,  and  I  knew  not  how  it  happened  to  me ; 
and  thereupon  I  turned  my  heart  to  praise  God 
for  it. 

**  For  I  saw  and  knew  the  Being  of  all  Beings, 
the  Byss  (the  ground  or  original  foundation),  and 
Abyss  (that  which  is  without  ground,  or  bottom- 
less and  fathomless) ;  also  the  birth  [or  eternal 
generation]  of  the  holy  Trinity ;  the  descent,  and 
original  of  this  world,  and  of  all  creatures,  through 
the  divine  wisdom  ;  I  knew  and  saw  in  myself  all 
the  three  worlds ;  namely,  the  divine,  angelical, 
and  paradisical  [world]  and  then  the  dark  world ; 
being  the  original  of  nature  to  the  fire  :  And  then 
thirdly,  the  external,  and  visible  world,  being  a 
procreation,  or  extern  birth ;   or  as  a  substance 


§40]  MYSTICISM  75 

expressed,  or  spoken  forth,  from  both  the  internal 
and  spiritual  worlds ;  and  I  saw,  and  knew  the 
whole  Being  [or  working  essence]  in  the  evil,  and  in 
the  good ;  and  the  mutual  original,  and  existence 
of  each  of  them ;  and  likewise  how  the  pregnant 
mother  (genetrix  or  fruitful  bearing  womb  of 
eternity)  brought  forth,  so  that  I  did  not  only 
greatly  wonder  at  it,  but  did  also  exceedingly 
rejoice* 

**  And  presently  it  came  powerfully  into  my 
mind  to  set  the  same  down  in  writing,  for  a 
memorial  to  myself;  albeit  I  could  very  hardly 
apprehend  the  same  in  my  external  man,  and 
express  it  with  the  pen  ;  yet  however  I  must  begin 
to  labour  in  these  great  Mysteries  as  a  child  that 
goeth  to  school :  I  saw  it  (as  in  a  great  deep)  in  the 
internal,  for  I  had  a  thorough  view  of  the  universe 
as  in  a  chaos,  wherein  all  things  are  couched  and 
wrapped  up,  but  it  was  impossible  for  me  to 
explicate  and  unfold  the  same. 

**  Yet  it  opened  itself  in  me  from  time  to  time, 
as  in  a  young  plant :  albeit  the  same  was  with  me 
for  the  space  of  twelve  years,  and  I  was  as  it  were 
pregnant  (or  breeding  of  it)  with  all,  and  found  a 
powerful  driving  and  instigation  within  me,  before 
I  could  bring  it  forth  into  an  external  form  of 
writing ;  which  afterward  fell  upon  me  as  a  sudden 
shower,  which  hitteth  whatsoever  it  lighteth  upon  ; 


76       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§40 

just  so  it  happened  to  me,  whatsoever  I  could  appre- 
hend, and  bring  into  the  external  [principle  of  my 
mind]  the  same  I  wrote  down» 

**  However,  afterward  the  sun  did  shine  on  me 
a  good  while,  but  not  in  a  continual  constant 
manner;  for  when  the  same  did  hide  itself,  I 
scarce  knew,  or  well  understood  my  own  labour  [or 
writing]  so  that,  man  must  acknowledge  that  his 
knowledge  is  not  his  own,  or  from  himself,  but 
God's  and  from  God  ;  and  that  God  knoweth  [or 
manifests  the  ideas  of  His  wisdom]  in  the  soul  of 
man  after  what  manner  and  measure  He  pleaseth/*^® 

Discussion  of  §  41*  That  a  subjective  element  entered  largely 
Seership  into  Boehme*s  visions  seems  evident  from  the 
form  in  which  they  are  expressed  in  his  works, 
which  borders  at  times  upon  the  fantastical ; 
though  it  might  be  argued  that  they  were  not, 
perhaps,  actually  experienced  in  this  form,  but 
merely  expressed  therein  afterwards — certainly, 
the  inspired  shoemaker,  as  he  himself  tells  us  in 
the  passage  already  quoted,  experienced  great 
difficulty  in  giving  his  experiences  outward  expres- 
sion* Boehme  was  of  an  emotional  temperament, 
much  given  to  rhapsodising,  and  in  spite  of  the 
many  most  precious  jewels  of  thought  and  feeling 

^*  Jacob  Boehme  :   Epistles  (J*  E/s  translation.  Epistle  11*, 
§§  6-1 1, 1 886  reprint,  pp,  29  and  30). 


§42]  MYSTICISM  77 

to  be  found  in  his  works,  there  is  also  a  not  incon- 
siderable quantity  of  what  may  be  termed  clay. 
But  after  all  has  been  said  that  can  justly  be  said 
in  criticism  of  Boehme,  the  fact  remains  that  his 
works  do  contain  these  jewels,  and  that  from  an 
uneducated  cobbler,  Boehme  became  one  of  the 
greatest  and  most  spiritual  exponents  of  Christian 
Mysticism  of  his  own  or  any  other  day*  That  he 
did  experience  an  inward  spiritual  enlightenment 
and  that  his  visions  did  involve  a  valuable  element 
of  objective  spiritual  verity,  seem  beyond  reason- 
able doubt. 

§  42.  The  case  of  Emanuel  Swedenborg  is,  in  The  Tcsti- 
many  respects,  even  more  remarkable  and  of  even  e^ucI 
greater  importance.    I  have  said  that  most  of  the  Swedenborg 
mystics  who  claimed  to  have  experienced  visions  of 
spiritual  beings  were  of  a  rather  emotional  type 
of  mind  :  the  seership  of  Sweden's  great  mystic- 
philosopher   constitutes   a  striking  exception  to 
this  usually  valid  generalisation.    Like  Boehme, 
Swedenborg  ^  did  not  seek  for  visions  of  spiritual 
beings,  and  like  him  also,  he  had  from  his  earliest 
age  a  profound  faith  in  the  Christian  religion  as  he 
then  understood  it.    But  unhke  Boehme,  he  was  of 

»•  The  humility  of  both  Boehme  and  Swedenborg,  their  entire 
lack  of  intellectual  pride,  is  a  further  point  of  resemblance  well 
worth  noticing. 


78       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§42 

an  intellectual  type  of  mind,  a  practical  scientist  and 

a  practical  politician,  with  a  European  reputation 

for  his  learnings    Ardently  he  sought  for  the  soul 

analytically,  hoping  to  discover  it  by  physiological 

investigations — until  the  vision  came,  and  he  laid 

aside  this  work  for  a  still  higher  calling.    Other 

seers  have  claimed  to  have  experienced  more  or 

less  brief  and  fleeting  visions  of  things  spiritual : 

Swedenborg  asserts  that  his  spiritual  sight  was 

opened  by  God,  and  that  he  enjoyed  constant 

communication  with  the  spiritual  realm  —  with 

devils  as  well  as  angels — during  the  space  of  many 

years,  whilst  in  full  possession  of  those  keen  mental 

powers  which  warrant  us  to  say  of  him,  that  no 

type  of  mind  could  be  imagined  better  qualified  to 

see  things  in  a  right  perspective.    Together  with 

these  ''  outward  *'  visions  came  also  the  inward 

spiritual  enlightenment  of  his  mind,  whereby  their 

meaning  became  plain   to  him.     Thus,  in  his 

work  on  Heaven  and  its  Wonders,  and  Hell,  he 

writes,  **  .  .  .  it  has  been  granted  me  to  associate 

with  angels  and  to  talk  with  them  as  one  man  with 

another ;  and  also  to  see  what  exists  in  the  heavens 

and  in  the  hells,  and  this  for  thirteen  years ;  and 

to  describe  them  from  the  evidence  of  my  own  eyes 

and  ears  in  the  hope  that  ignorance  may  be 

enlightened,  and  unbehef  dispelled.''  ^    Elsewhere 

'0  Emanuel  Swedenborg  :  Heaven  and  its  Wonders,  and  Hell, 
§  I  (edition  in  Everyman's  Library,  trans*  by  F.  Bayley). 


§43]  MYSTICISM  79 

he  says,  **  ♦  ♦  ♦  the  Lord  manifested  himself 
before  me  his  servant  .  ♦  .  and  afterwards  opened 
the  sight  of  my  spirit,  and  so  let  me  into  the 
spiritual  world,  permitting  me  to  see  the  heavens 
and  the  hells,  and  also  to  converse  with  angels  and 
spirits,  and  this  now  continually  for  many  years, 
I  attest  in  truth/'  ^i  And  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
New  Church  which  was  to  be  established — the 
Church  consisting  in  the  mystic  union  of  those  who 
worship  the  Lord  God  in  spirit  and  truth,  who 
walk  in  the  paths  of  righteousness,  seeking,  not  for 
self,  but  for  the  good  of  others — he  writes  in  the 
same  place :  **  I  have  never  received  anything 
relating  to  the  doctrines  of  that  church  from  any 
angel,  but  from  the  Lord  alone,  while  I  was  read- 
ing the  Word/'  Swedenborg  most  vividly  realised 
that  momentous  truth,  which  he  so  often  explicitly 
teaches,  that  all  Good  and  all  Truth  are  of  God  and 
from  God  alone*  No  man  can  speak  that  which  is 
true,  nor  do  that  which  is  good,  unless,  in  the  very 
widest  and  grandest  meaning  of  the  word,  he  is 
inspired  from  the  Divine  Source  of  all  good  and 
truth* 


§  43.  All  systems  of  philosophy,  as  Professor  Empiricism 

and 
ism 


James  pointed  out,  can  be  broadly  divided  into  two  ^^  Ra^ional- 


"  Emanuel  Swedenborg  :     The    True   Christian   Religion, 
§  779« 


8o       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§43 

groups,  the  rationalistic  and  the  empiricaL  The 
term  **  rationahstic  **  is  not,  perhaps,  a  very  happy 
one,  but  it  is  here  used  to  denote  those  systems 
which  are  based  upon  **  principles  **  and  con- 
structed by  means  of  a  priori  reasoning,  whereas 
the  empirical  systems  are  those  which  are  based 
upon  facts  and  constructed  by  means  of  a  posteriori 
reasoning.  The  former  systems  have  generally 
been  associated  with  religion  and  what  Professor 
James  calls  **  tender-mindedness  ** ;  the  latter 
with  irreligion  and  **  tough-mindedness/*  But 
as  Professor  James  indicates,  it  were  a  good  thing 
if  Religion  and  Empiricism  could  be  combined. 
This  combination  seems  actually  to  have  been 
effected  in  the  case  of  the  mystics. 


Superstition,  §  44,  Certainly,  those  systems  of  philosophy 
Philosophy  which  attempt  to  evolve  the  whole  Cosmos  out  of 
EnfpSm  bare  thought,  and  give  experience  second  place, 
seem  very  unsatisfactory.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  is  empiricism  and  empiricism.  There 
is  an  empiricism  which  just  blindly  accepts  the 
crude  facts  of  experience,  never  trying  to  discover 
the  relations  between  them  or  to  understand  their 
meanings.  To  some  extent  this  criticism  holds 
good  of  what  is  called  Common  Sense.  Common 
Sense  does,  indeed,  seek  to  generalise  experience 


§44]  MYSTICISM  8i 

and  to  be  guided  by  the  results  of  such  generalisa- 
tions, but  it  does  so  hastily;  and  it  may  quite 
easily  degenerate  into  Superstition,  Le*,  the 
supposition  that  events  are  connected  which  are 
not  connected  in  the  manner  supposed ♦  Thus,  no 
one,  presumably,  believes  that  to  spill  salt  will 
entail  bad  fortune,  unless  he  has  once  observed 
bad  luck  to  follow  the  spilling  of  salt,  or  has  it  on 
the  authority  of  someone  whose  word  he  trusts,  that 
this  has  actually  been  observed.  Consequently, 
inasmuch  as  his  superstitious  belief  is  based  upon 
experience,  he  may  be  termed  an  empiricist.  But 
he  is  a  very  poor  empiricist.  Otherwise  he  would 
interrogate  experience  again  ;  either  by  spilling  salt 
and  observing  the  result  in  his  o\vn  case,  or  else  by 
carefully  noting  what  happened  when  other  persons 
spilled  salt.  This  is,  indeed,  just  the  difference 
between  the  empiricism  of  common  sense  and 
scientific  empiricism :  Science  does  not  accept 
experience  at  face  value,  but  experiments,  in  order 
to  ehminate  all  adventitious  elements,  and  to  gain 
a  knowledge  of  the  true  relations  between  facts. 
There  is,  moreover,  a  still  higher  form  of  empiri- 
cism ;  rational  empiricism,  if  I  may  so  call  it — an 
empiricism  which  has  joined  hands  with  rationalism 
and  become  assimilated  therewith.  This,  at  least, 
is  what  I  understand  by  Philosophy  : — an  examina- 
tion of  experience  in  order  to  get  at  its  Source,  to 


82       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§44 

\^  understand  its  purpose,  in  a  word,  to  make  plain  its 
Spiritual  Meaning* 

Mysticism  §  45*  Mysticism  may  be  regarded,  as  I  have 
Empiricism  suggested  above,  as  empiricism  applied  to  religious 
experience.  But  it  must  be  confessed  that  the 
empiricism  of  the  majority  of  mystics  seems  to  be 
largely  that  of  the  merely  **  common  sense  **  order. 
They  accept  the  experiences  vouchsafed  to  them 
in  thankfulness  and  wonder,  but  their  very  awe 
and  delight  prevent  them  from  examining  such 
experiences  in  a  scientific  and  rational  manner. 
With  Swedenborg,  however,  the  case  is  different. 
His  early  scientific  and  philosophical  training  en- 
abled him  coolly  and  critically  to  analyse  his  experi- 
ences, and  to  bring  to  bear  upon  them  his  know- 
ledge of  scientific  and  philosophical  method.  This 
coolness,  this  spirit  of  scientific  detachment, 
causes  many  readers  to  dislike  his  books ;  but 
philosophically  considered,  it  is  one  of  Sweden- 
borg*s  most  valuable  characteristics  ;  for  it  enabled 
him,  so  it  seems  to  me,  to  formulate  for  the  first 
time  a  philosophy  of  the  spiritual,  based  not  on 
speculation,  but  on  experience  ;  a  system  at  once 
empirical  and  rational. 


> 


PART  III 
THE  NATURE  AND  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH 


\ 


PART  III 

THE  NATURE  AND  CRITERIA  OF  TRUTH 

§  46.  That  which  is,  is  true.    Hence  absolute  Absolute 

,  1    •     •  1        •       •  •      Truth  Un- 

truth, truth  in  Its  entirety  and  unity,  is  coextensive  knowable 

with  the  whole  of  existence.  To  us  who  can  per- 
ceive only  a  part  of  things,  who  cannot  altogether 
escape  from  ourselves  and  see  the  whole  Cosmos 
as  it  is  from  every  point  of  view  at  once,  absolute 
truth  is  unknown  and  unknowable.  We  can,  with 
an  effort,  bring  ourselves  sometimes  to  see  things 
from  the  view-point  of  others ;  but  we  never 
wholly  succeed  in  this,  because  our  sight  is  our 
own  ;  and  even  were  we  to  do  so,  we  should  still 
be  regarding  things  from  an  individual  view-point. 
The  knowledge  of  absolute  truth  belongs  to  God 
alone  Who,  immanent  in  all  things,  can  perceive 
all  things  from  every  point  of  view  at  once,  and 
as  Cause  of  all  things  good  (that  is  of  all  real  exist- 
ence, since  evil  exists  only  negatively,  as  a  defect  in, 
or  perversion  of,  that  which  otherwise  is  or  would 
be  good)  is  the  Fountain  of  all  truth.  Truth,  then, 
is  the  form  of  all  real  existence,  that  is,  the  mode  of 
manifestation  of  God.  Put  more  briefly,  it  is  the 
form  of  good  or  love. 

35 


86       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§46 

Although  we  can  never  gain  a  knowledge  of  truth 
in  its  entirety  and  unity,  we  may  catch  many 
glimpses  of  its  splendour,  and  just  as  a  mathemati- 
cal series  may  for  ever  progress  towards  some  limit 
which  it  never  reaches,  or  just  as  a  hyperbola  on 
production  continually  approaches  but  never 
meets  its  asymptotes,  so  may  we  for  ever  progress 
towards,  but  never  gain,  a  knowledge  of  absolute 
truth.  We  may,  indeed,  know  truths  relating  to 
the  absolute,  for  all  truths  concerning  truth  are  of 
this  nature ;  but  this  is  not  the  same  thing  as  to 
know  absolute  truth. 

Mathematical  §  47.  As  the  notion  of  asymptotic  approach 
(i.)"converg-  referred  to  above  will  probably  be  a  new  one  to 
cnt  Series  readers  who  have  not  studied  mathematics,  and 
since  it  seems  a  very  useful  one  in  connection  with 
the  question  of  man*s  progress  towards  a  know- 
ledge of  absolute  truth,  some  further  remarks  on 
it  may  not  here  be  out  of  place. 

Mathematics  acquaints  us  with  numerous  series 
of  quantities — in  which  each  term  is  formed  from 
the  preceding  by  some  fixed  law  or  rule — which 
possess  this  remarkable  property :  that  by  taking 
a  sufficient  number  of  terms  and  adding  them 
together,  we  can  obtain  a  quantity  which  shall 
differ  from  a  certain  quantity,  depending  on  the 
nature  of  the  series,  by  as  httle  as  we  please;    but 


§  48  ]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  87 

however  many  terms  we  may  take  and  add 
together,  the  result  will  always  fall  short  of  this 
latter  quantity.  Thus,  considering  the  series  as  a 
progression,  its  sum  continually  approaches,  but 
never  actually  coincides  with,  some  fixed  quantity 
depending  on  the  nature  of  the  series. 

Recurring  decimals  afford  an  example  of  such 
series.    Thus : — 

•33~T(?o  or  s^^h^*     ♦3333^TxfW(7  or  f— ^uJ^n)* 

and  so  on.  Consequently,  the  more  terms  we 
take  of  the  recurring  decimal  .3,  that  is,  of  the 
infinite  series  -^^  +  y^^  +  y/^xr  +  T<jh^  +  .  .  .  , 
and  add  them  together,  the  more  nearly  does  the 
^  result  approach  |.  But,  however  many  terms  we 
take,  their  sum  is  never  quite  J  :  it  is  always  just  a 
little  less. 

So  may  man's  knowledge  continually  approach 
to,  but  never  reach,  that  of  absolute  truth.  And 
that  this  is  necessary  to  his  happiness  is  evident 
from  the  fact  that  happiness  is  the  product  of  felt 
progress,  and  if  progress  terminate,  however  it  may 
terminate,  happiness  can  no  longer  result. 

§  48.  It  may  be  argued,  however,  that  the  Mathematical 
series  mentioned  above  is  not  really  analogous  to  (""^Divw^* 
man's  progress  in  a  knowledge  of  truth,  because  ^°^  ^®"^ 


88       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§48 

each  term  is  less  than  that  preceding  it,  the  rate  of 
the  progress  of  the  sum  of  the  series  being  a 
decreasing  one ;  whereas  in  the  case  of  man's 
knowledge  of  truth,  the  rate  of  progress  is  an 
increasing  one,  each  stage  showing  more  truth 
gained  than  during  any  preceding  one  of  the  same 
duration*  But  this  difference  is  because  the  goal 
towards  which  man's  knowledge  of  truth  con- 
tinually advances,  but  never  reaches,  is,  not  a 
finite,  but  an  infinite  one.  Now,  all  series  in 
which  succeeding  terms  are  greater  than  preceding 
are  divergent,  i\e.,  there  is  no  finite  quantity  which 
their  sum  cannot  be  made  to  exceed  by  taking  a 
sufficient  number  of  terms.  Thus,  consider  the 
series : — 

I,  2,  4,  8,  16  ♦  ♦  • 

By  adding  together  a  sufficient  number  of  its  terms, 
each  of  which  is  twice  that  of  the  preceding,  we  can 
obtain  a  quantity  greater  than  any  finite  quantity 
we  please.  Thus  to  exceed  100  we  must  take  seven 
terms,  and  to  exceed  1000  we  must  take  ten.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  however  many  terms  we  do 
take  and  add  together,  it  is  always  possible  to  con- 
ceive of  a  quantity  greater  than  this  result.  Thus, 
however  many  terms  we  do  take,  their  sum  is  never 
infinite.  And  the  same  statement  holds  good  of 
series  in  which  each  term  is  not  merely  twice  that 


§  49  ]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  89 

of  the  preceding  one,  but  even  a  hundred,  a  thou- 
sand, or  any  finite  number  of  times,  as  great.  So 
with  man's  knowledge  of  truth,  it  may  for  ever 
increase,  and  its  rate  of  increase  may  for  ever 
y^  increase,  yet  never  does  it  become  a  knowledge  of 
absolute  (Le.,  infinite)  truth  ♦ 

§  49,  A   similar   phenomenon    of    asymptotic  Mathematical 

1     •  1  •!_  V  J    t_  ^  •  1-1    Illustrations : 

approach  is  exhibited  by  certain  curves,  which  (jji.)  The 

progress  according  to  fixed  rules  or  laws.  The  Hyperbola 
hyperbola  (see  page  91)  is  one  of  the  simplest 
cases.  The  hyperbola  shown  in  the  diagram  is 
constructed  according  to  the  following  rule.  Two 
straight  lines,  which  are  to  be  the  asymptotes  of 
the  hyperbola,  i.e.,  the  lines  which  it  continually 
approaches,  but  never  meets,  are  drawn  at  right 
angles  to  one  another.  Let  the  point  where  they 
cut  be  called  **  O.*'  Then,  if  any  distance  be 
measured  in  inches  from  O  along  either  asymptote, 
the  perpendicular  distance  of  this  point  from  the 
hyperbola  is,  also  measured  in  inches,  the  recipro- 
cal ^  of  the  first  measurement.  Thus  OM  is 
3  inches,  PM  is  J  inch.  It  is  evident,  therefore, 
that  the  hyperbola  will  never  meet  its  asymptotes, 

»  The  reciprocal  of  a  fraction  is  obtained  by  interchanging  its 
numerator  and  denominator.  Thus,  f  (or  i^)  is  the  reciprocal 
of  f.  All  integral  (or  whole)  numbers  may  be  considered  as 
fractions  with  denominator  i.  Thus,  3  may  be  written  ?,  so 
that  its  reciprocal  is  h* 


90       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§49 

although  by  producing  it,  we  can  make  it  approach 
as  near  to  them  as  we  please*  Thus  if  we  con- 
tinued curve  and  asymptote  10  feet  (==120  inches) 
from  O,  the  distance  between  the  two  would 
be  only  t|^  inch*  The  two  asymptotes  may  be 
regarded  as  representing  absolute  truth,  and  the 
hyperbola  as  man's  gradual  approximation  thereto* 
The  analogy  may  be  further  extended  if,  adopting 
a  system  of  symbolism  I  suggested  in  A  Mathemati-- 
cal  Theory  of  Spirit  (19 12),  we  regard  the  horizontal 
asymptote  as  representing  the  totality  of  natural 
truth,  the  vertical  asymptote  as  representing  the 
totality  of  spiritual  truth.  We  may  consider  man's 
knowledge  as  commencing  at  either  vertex  of  the 
hyperbola  (V,  V  on  page  91),  the  vertices  being 
the  points  which  are  furthest  removed  from  the 
asymptotes.  In  the  case  of  a  man  who  cultivates 
a  knowledge  of  both  natural  and  spiritual  truth, 
I.e.,  the  genuine  philosopher,  we  may  imagine  his 
consciousness  as  gradually  flowing  from  V  or  V 
along  the  hyperbola  in  both  directions,  though 
possibly  at  different  rates*  But  in  the  case  of  one 
who  concerned  himself  only  with  natural  science, 
the  vertical  flow  would  not  take  place* 

All  Natural        §  50*  All   measurement  involves   some   error, 
DTOximate      however  accurately  it  may  be  carried  out ;  thus,  if 
one  measures  a  distance  with  a  ruler  graduated 


proximate 


*^aymptott 


Asymptote. 


HYPERBOLA   /«iD  ASYMPTOTES 
(All  measurements  reduced  §*) 


92       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§50 

in  hundredths  of  an  inch,  it  is  possible  that  the 
measurement  may  be  as  much  as  five-thousandths 
of  an  inch  too  great  or  too  little  ;  and  if  one  uses 
some  special  instrument  (e.g.,  a  micrometer  gauge), 
which  will  give  thousandths  and  even  tenths  of 
thousandths  of  an  inch  correctly,  the  measurement 
still  falls  short  of  absolute  accuracy,  and  may  be  as 
much  as  five  hundredths  of  a  thousandth  of  an 
inch  too  great  or  too  little^  So  small  a  quantity  as 
this,  of  course,  has  no  practical  meaning,  but  it 
certainly  has  a  significance  for  the  philosophy  of 
the  Absolute.  For  if  all  measurement  involves 
error,  be  it  only  extremely  slight,  all  natural  laws 
>  which  express  the  quantitative  relations  between 
phenomena  are  approximate  only,  and  thus  fall 
short  of  being  absolutely  true.  As  the  degree  of 
approximation  is  improved,  so  the  statement  of 
the  law  becomes  more  complex  and  more  terms 
are  involved.  Thus,  take  the  law,  partly  dis- 
covered by  Boyle,  partly  by  Gay-Lussac,  concern- 
ing the  pressure,  temperature  and  volume  of  a  gas. 
This  law  may  be  expressed  by  the  formula — 

PV=RT 

— ^where  P  is  the  pressure,  V  the  volume,  T  the 
absolute  temperature  (i.e.,  temperature  in  degrees 
Centigrade,  plus  273°  C),  and  R  a  constant  quan- 
tity.  This  law  is  very  simple.    It  holds  good  with 


§  51  ]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  93 

fair  accuracy  of  most  gases,  but  of  none  is  it 
absolutely  true.    Van  der  WaaFs  equation — 

(P  +  v^.)  (V  -  6)  ==  RT 

— ^in  which  two  new  terms,  a  and  b  are  introduced, 
depending  upon  the  nature  of  the  gas,  is  more 
accurate  than  the  simpler  equation  PV=RT; 
but  even  van  der  Waal's  equation  is  no  more  than 
an  approximation,  and  of  no  gas  does  it  hold  with 
absolute  accuracy*  No  doubt  a  more  accurate 
equation  could  be  obtained  by  introducing  more 
terms,  and  so  on,  ad  infinitum.  An  equation  repre- 
senting the  relation  between  any  two  phenomena 
with  absolute  accuracy  would  involve  infinite 
terms,  and  thus  the  whole  of  existence.  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  every  fact  involves  something  of  the 
infinite  in  it,  and  is  thus  not  completely  expHcable. 

§51.  Nor  are  the  truths  of  Mathematics,  as  This  State- 
some  think,  exempt  from  the  charge  of  being  only  xmc  of  the 
approximations,  and  not  absolute  ;  though,  indeed,  if^  °^  ^ 
I  freely  admit  that  they  are  approximations  of  an 
exceptionally  high  order  of  accuracy.     There  is, 
for  instance,  as  Riemann  and  Lobachewski  have 
shown,  no  logical  reason  why  the  sum  of  the  three 
angles  of  a  triangle  should  be  exactly  equal  to  two 
right  angles  ;  for  Euchd's  proof  of  this  proposition 
is  based  upon  a  supposition  as  to  the  nature  of 


94       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§51 

.  parallel  straight  lines  which  really  assumes  its 
truth  (see  below,  §  55)^  It  is  true,  indeed,  that 
the  most  accurate  measurements  that  have  been 
carried  out  have  never  shown  any  deviation  of  the 
sum  of  the  angles  of  a  triangle  from  two  right 
angles ;  so  that  for  scientific  purposes  we  should 
treat  Euclid's  proposition  as  true.^  But  for  the 
purposes  of  philosophical  speculation  it  must  be 
remembered  that  a  deviation  of  the  sum  of  these 
angles  from  two  right  angles  may  exist,  though 
smaller  in  magnitude  than  the  smallest  angular 
differences  that  the  most  accurate  instruments  yet 
constructed  by  man  are  capable  of  measuring* 

All  Know-  §  52*  It  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasised  that 
Truth  Given  every  glimpse  we  have  of  truth  is  the  gift  of  God, 
^Jnspira-  £qj,  since  all  truth  is  of  and  from  God,  truths  become 
man's  only  in  virtue  of  Divine  Revelation,  whether 
consciously  perceived  as  such,  or  not*  There  can 
be  absolutely  no  knowledge  of  truth  (whether 
relating  to  the  world  of  nature  or  to  that  of  spirit) 
which  is  not  of  this  origin*  Of  course,  I  am  using 
the  expression  **  divine  revelation  **  in  its  widest 
(and  truest)  sense,  and  not  hmiting  it  to  any  special 
experiences*  For,  accurately  speaking,  every  ex- 
perience that  makes  for  goodness  and  truth  is  a 

» Sec  the  Preface  to  the  present  writer's  Experimental  Mensura- 
tion (Heinemann,  19x2)* 


§52]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  95 

divine  revelation*  Rationality  (or  reason,  if  that 
term  is  used  in  the  wide  meaning  given  to  it  in  §  38, 
as  I  intend  doing  in  what  follows) — rationality  is 
the  inner  ear  God  has  given  man  whereby  he  may 
hear  His  Voice  ;  and  God  speaks  most  eloquently 
to  man,  both  through  nature,  or  the  world  of  outer 
experience,  and  through  the  heart,  or  world  of 
inner  experience*^ 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  distinction  between 
revelation  and  discovery  is  largely  a  verbal  one. 
The  two  terms  merely  refer  to  the  same  process 
regarded  from  different  points  of  view  :  not  (as  is 
commonly  supposed)  to  two  different  processes 
or  modes  in  which  man  gains  a  knowledge  of 
truth.  A  truth  to  become  man's  must  be  given  by 
God  and  received  by  man  ;  it  must,  therefore,  be 
both  revealed  and  discovered.  That  it  must  be 
revealed  has  been  shown  already :  that  it  must  be 
discovered  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  no  truth 
can  be  known  to  man  unless  it  be  rationally  apper- 
ceived.  A  truth  cannot  carry  a  divine  warrant 
external  to  itself.  Its  rationality  is  its  divine 
warrant.  If  I  am  irrational  I  may  judge  it  not  to 
be  true  ;  but  to  an  irrational  person  a  knowledge  of 

'  I  have  not  mentioned  the  Bible  in  the  above  passage  as  a 
specific  form  of  God's  revelation  to  man,  because  the  truths  of 
the  Bible  only  become  man's  in  virtue  of  that  inner  experience 
which  has  already  been  mentioned.  Something  more  will  be 
said  on  this  point  later. 


96       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§52 

truth  is  not  possible.  Thus  rationality  or  reason 
is  the  sole  criterion  of  truth  :  a  statement  is  true 
if  it  is  rational;  it  is  not  true  if  it  is  irrationaL 

Induction  §  53,  The  criterion  of  rationality,  however, 
permits  of  discussion  under  three  main  heads,  and 
we  may,  therefore,  speak  of  three  criteria,  any  or 
all  of  which  (preferably  all,  where  possible)  may  be 
employed  in  judging  of  the  truth  of  any  statement : 
the  inductive,  the  deductive,  and  the  pragmatic. 
All  three  criteria  involve  the  appeal  to  experience, 
which,  as  the  form  of  revelation,  is,  rationally 
interpreted,  the  final  test  of  truth.  Induction, 
however,  is  par  excellence  the  appeal  to  experience, 
that  is,  let  it  be  repeated,  to  revelation  from  God, 
Experience  is  the  basis  of  discovery.  We  know, 
.  however,  that  experience  is  not  free  from  error : 
one's  experiences  reflect  one's  faults.  This  is  in- 
evitable, for  man  can  observe  things  only  through 
his  own  senses  and  from  one  standpoint  at  once. 
To  obviate  the  errors  thus  arising  in  observations 
relating  to  the  physical  realm,  men  of  science 
employ  instruments  to  supplement  and  correct  the 
sense-impressions  of  the  observer,  and  one  experi- 
ence is  compared  with  another,  so  that  the  various 
elements  of  error  in  each  may  be  eliminated  and 
the  common  element  of  truth  obtained.  This  is 
the  business  of  Science. 


\ 


§54]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  97 

We  should  commit  a  fatal  error,  however,  if  we 
availed  ourselves  only  of  experience  gained  by 
the  outer  senses :  there  is  an  inner  experience  of  the 
heart  and  mind,  by  which  is  revealed  the  true 
spiritual  significance  of  the  symbols  of  which  this 
world  consists*  I  mean  the  vision  of  the  poet, 
rather  than  the  extraordinary  experiences  of  the 
psychic.  As  we  have  seen,  the  visions  of  the 
psychic,  though  always  of  interest  and  importance 
to  the  science  of  psychology,  may  be  anything 
other  than  spiritual.  The  vision  of  the  poet, 
which  is  spiritual  vision,  is  free  to  all.  Only  it  is 
necessary  that  we  clarify  our  inner  sight  by  the 
purification  of  our  inner  selves,  lest  we  be  misled 
by  the  false  visions  of  evil  desires. 

§  54.  The  spiritual  message  of  the  Bible  is  The  Bible  as 
manifest  to  the  inner  sight,  in  so  far  as  it  is  purified  Truth'^^  ° 
and  educated  to  receive  it.  If  the  Bible  were  a 
text-book  of  history  or  physical  science  it  would  be 
right  to  apply  to  it  the  criteria  of  history  or  physical 
science,  which  are  inductive  criteria  based  on 
sensuous  experience.  But  the  Bible  is  of  an 
entirely  different  nature  from  this.  It  is  of 
spiritual  import  and  meaning,  and  the  inductive 
criterion  of  the  inner  experience  of  the  heart  and 
mind  proclaims  it  to  be  the  Word  of  God.  That, 
at  least,  is  the  unanimous  testimony  of  the  great 

G 


98       THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§54 

Christian  mystics*    And  Swedenborg's  doctrine 
of  Correspondences,  according  to  which  every 
natural  object  is  the  symbol  of  some  spiritual 
^  verity  to  which  it  bears  a  functional  analogy, 

renders  this  view  of  the  Bible  the  more  sure.  For 
this  doctrine  makes  plain  the  true  structure  of  the 
Bible,  and  explains  its  felt  spiritual  worth  by  show- 
ing how,  in  the  Bible,  historical  and  other  natural 
ideas  are  utilised  symbolically  to  express  spiritual 
and  divine  verities  concerning  God  and  the  soul. 

Deduction  §  55*  Deduction  is  the  appeal  to  the  principle 
of  the  unity  of  Truth.  Nothing  can  really  be 
discovered  by  deductive  reasoning,  for  all  that  is 
contained  in  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism  is 
necessarily  contained  in  its  premises.  In  deduc- 
tive reasoning  the  mind  does  not,  as  in  inductive 
reasoning,  take  a  leap  beyond  what  is  given  and 
gain  a  higher  vision  and  a  more  comprehensive 
truth.  The  whole  of  Euclid's  Geometry,  for 
example,  is  really  contained  in  his  fundamental 
suppositions.  But  deduction  does  enable  us  to 
behold  a  truth  in  all  its  fulness  and  beauty,  to 
behold  within  it  depths  undreamt  of:  were  it 
not  for  Euclid's  deductive  system  of  Geometry, 
^  who  would  dream  one-half  of  what  his  funda- 
mental suppositions  contain  i  This  is  very  near 
akin  to  discovery* 


§  56]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  99 

Deduction  enables  us  to  compare  a  supposition 
with  a  truth  related  to  it,  whereby,  being  sure  of 
the  essential  unity  of  truth,  we  may  judge  as  to  the 
validity  of  this  supposition  according  to  its  harmony 
or  disharmony  with  what  we  already  know  to  be 
true.  Deduction,  therefore,  enables  us  to  avail 
ourselves  of  the  results  of  the  experience  of  others. 
Valuable  though  one's  own  experience  is  to  one- 
self, and  this  is  not  less  true  in  religion  than  in 
other  matters,  man  would  never  have  progressed  in 
knowledge  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  experience 
and  its  results  may  be  stored  up,  so  to  speak,  in 
tradition  and  in  books,  and  handed  on  from 
generation  to  generation. 

§  56.  A  blind  faith  is  no  faith,  whether  in  Faith  and 
Science  or  Religion.  Man  is  a  rational  creature,  *^  ^ 
and  in  virtue  of  his  rationality  can  see  what  is  true. 
The  surest  truth  is  not  gained  by  argument  but  by 
sight — spiritual  or  rational  sight.  **  Truth,**  said 
the  mystic-poet  Blake,  **  can  never  be  told  so  as  to 
be  understood,  and  not  be  believ*d.**  If  this  be 
true,  still  more  emphatically  is  it  true  that  man 
cannot  be  forced  (as  distinguished  from  rationally 
led)  into  a  knowledge  of  truth.  A  belief  in  certain 
doctrines  forced  on  the  mind  by  means  of  miracles 
or  marvellous  occurrences  may  be  necessary  in  a 
certain  stage  of  man's  intellectual  evolution,  but 


100      THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§56 

it  does  not  result  in  that  real  knowledge  of  truth 
which  is  essential  to  a  true  faith.  It  is  good  for 
\  the  child  to  learn  everything  from  its  own  experi- 
ence, as  far  as  possible*  But  this  is  not  completely 
possible  :  there  are  certain  facts  which,  for  the 
time  being,  it  must  accept  on  the  authority  of  its 
parents  (miracle-workers  in  its  sight)  ♦  It  cannot, 
however,  be  said  really  to  know  these  truths,  unless, 
and  until,  either  it  shall  have  experienced  them  for 
itself,  or  the  logical  connection  of  these  truths  with 
other  facts  of  its  experience  shall  have  been  made 
plain  ♦  Then  its  behef  ceases  to  rest  on  authority, 
and  becomes  grounded  in  the  rational  interpreta- 
tion of  experience* 

Sweden-  §57*  The  necessity  of  rational  conviction  for  true 

ttidl  ^  "^"  ^^^^^  ^^  ^  point  much  emphasised  in  the  philosophy 
of  Swedenborg.  And  it  was  on  this  account  that  the 
Swedish  seer,  although  claiming  to  be  in  constant 
communication  with  the  spiritual  world  for  many 
years,  disliked  to  give  any  outward  sign  of  the 
fact  of  this  communication,  lest  it  should  force  any 
one  to  accept  his  doctrines  without  understanding 
V  them*  For  Swedenborg's  philosophy  and  theology 
are  rational*  It  is  this  which  so  markedly  distin- 
guishes his  system  from  those  of  others  claiming 
supernormal  experiences,  rendering  it  of  so  great 
a  significance  for  modern  philosophy,  whereas 


§  58  ]      THE  NATURE  OF  TROTH*         K)t 

systems  based  on  authority  are  of  psyghpicgical;  ,, 
interest  only«  He  was  enabled* '16' apply  "tlie" 
rational  (or  scientific)  method  to  experience  of  the 
spiritual,  and  thus  to  place  the  philosophy  of  the 
spiritual  on  a  firm  basis.  And  in  virtue  of  the 
correspondential  relationship  between  matter  and 
spirit,  the  results  of  this  experience  could  be 
brought  into  relation  with  the  results  of  the  experi- 
ence gained  through  contact  with  this  world  of 
nature,  and  thus  so  expressed  as  to  be  rationally 
apperceivable  by  those  who  are  grounded  in  this 
latter  form  of  experience  ♦  This  does,  indeed, 
constitute  a  divine  revelation,  like  every  other 
discovery,  though  truly  of  exceptional  magnitude 
and  importance ♦  Whatever  outward  evidences* 
there  may  be  that  Swedenborg*s  claim  is  valid,  the 
final  proof  is  to  be  found  in  the  essential  rationality 
of  the  system  he  has  propounded,  in  an  irresistible 
appeal  to  heart  and  mind.  Beyond  its  rationality 
it  has  no  warrants,  for  to  speak  of  a  warrant  trans- 
cending the  rationality  of  truth  is  to  formulate  a 
contradiction  in  terms, 

"§  58.  There  is  an  old  fallacy,  according  to  which  The  Vnivet* 

our  reason,  being  finite,  is  unable  to  exercise  judg-  Rg^on^ 

*  For  these  evidences,  which  are  very  interesting  and  important 
in  their  way,  see  the  Appendices  to  E.  F.  Goerwitz's  translation 
of  Kant's  Dreams  of  a  Spirit-Seer  illustrated  by  Dreams  of 
Metaphysics,  edited  by  Frank  Sewall,  1900. 


loa     THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§58 

rmnt  in  matters  relating  to  the  infinite,  and 
whether  or  iiot  ot  2ny  use  in  deahng  with  purely 
physical  science,  ought  to  be  laid  aside  when  we 
come  to  religion.  But  if  we  are  to  lay  reason  aside 
and  submit  to  authority,  which  authority  shall  we 
choose  as  that  alone  which  will  instruct  us  in  right 
knowledge  S*  Every  sect  claims  authority,  and  if 
one  does  so  more  loudly  than  the  others,  is  that 
any  evidence  of  the  validity  of  its  claim  $*  But  to 
speak  of  reason  as  something  individual  and,  there- 
fore, defective,  is  to  misunderstand  the  nature  of 
reason.  Reason  is  everywhere  one  and  the  same. 
It  is  not  something  which  is  the  product  of  imper- 
fect man  :  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  rather  the  gift  of 
God.  To  be  reasonable  is  really  to  transcend 
oneself ;  it  is  to  lay  aside  all  that  pertains  to  self  in 
the  bad  sense  of  this  word  ;  to  desire,  not  that  this 
theory  shall  be  true  and  that  false,  but  only  that 
truth  may  be  gained.  As  John  Locke  says,  **  He 
that  would  acquit  himself  ♦  ♦  ♦  as  a  lover  of  truth, 
not  giving  way  to  any  preoccupation  or  bias  that 
may  mislead  him,  must  ♦  ♦  ♦  not  be  in  love  with 

^  any  opinion,  or  wish  it  to  be  true,  till  he  knows  it  to 
be  so,  and  then  he  will  not  need  to  wish  it :  for 

\^  nothing  that  is  false  can  deserve  our  good  wishes, 
nor  a  desire  that  it  should  have  the  place  and  force 
of  truth ;  and  yet  nothing  is  more  frequent  than 


§  59]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  103 

this/*  •    Thus,  to  be  truly  reasonable  is  to  lay  aside 
self-desire,  and  to  listen  to  the  Voice  of  God* 

§  59*  We  do  not,  indeed,  get  truth  out  of  the  The  True 
crude  facts  of  experience.  They  are  only  appear-  aS^thc  fTisc 
ances*  And  as  Swedenborg  remarks  **  ♦  ♦  ♦  to 
think  from  the  influx  of  natural  l^ht  not  en- 
lightened by  the  influx  of  spiritual  hght  is  merely 
to  dream,  and  to  speak  from  such  thought  is  to 
make  vain  assertions  like  fortune-tellers/*  *  But 
in  so  far  as  we  rationally  study  such  appearances, 
seeking  to  gain  the  truth  underlying  them,  in  so 
far  do  we  permit  a  divine  influx  of  truth  into  our 
minds.  We  may  be  content  to  stock  our  minds 
with  mere  memory-knowledges  of  facts  ;  but  if  we 
seek  to  understand  and  utilise  the  relations  between 
these  facts,  we  allow  the  influx  of  a  higher  order 
of  ideas  into  our  minds ;  and  we  receive  ideas  of  a 
still  higher  order  when  we  endeavour  rationally 
to  discover  the  spiritual  significance — the  purpose 
and  cause — of  such  facts.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
so  far  as  we  deny  right  reason,  and  rely  upon 
external  authority,  in  so  far  do  we  shut  out  the 
spiritual  light.  The  crude  facts  of  experience  are, 
as  it  were,  the  symbols  employed  in  a  magic 

•  John  Locke  :  Of  the  Conduct  of  the  Understanding,  §§  x.  and 
xi.  (edited  by  Thomas  Fowler,  D.D.,  1901). 

•  Emanuel  Swedenborg  :  The  Intercourse  of  the  Soul  and  the 
Body,  §  xiv.  8  (trans,  by  John  Presland,  1897). 


104     THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE   [§59 

ritual  whereby  Truth  manifests  herself  to  our 
spiritual  sight.  But,  to  continue  the  figure,  these 
symbols  may  be  used  either  for  white  magic  or  for 
black  :  by  means  of  the  appearances  of  nature  we 
can  confirm  ourselves  either  in  those  doctrines 
which  are  true  or  in  those  doctrines  which  are 
false,  according  to  whether  the  spiritual  hght  which 
alone  can  enlighten  natural  experience  is  received 
or  rejected.  The  same  holds  good  of  the  words  of 
Holy  Writ,  if ,  as  I  believe,  the  mystical  view  of 
both  Nature  and  the  Bible  (as  developed  by 
Swedenborg)  be  valid.  One  who  studies  the  Bible 
in  its  merely  literal  sense,  seeking  for  no  meanings 
beyond  those  of  **  the  letter  which  killeth,"  may 
not  only  confirm  himself  in  stupid  doctrines,  e.g., 
that  the  world  was  created  in  seven  days,  but  in 
immoral  ones,  e.g.,  that  God  is  vengeful ;  just  as 
a  person,  who  blindly  accepts  natural  facts  without 
examining  them  scientifically,  may  confirm  himself 
in  foolish  superstitions  (see  §  44),  or  as  one,  who 
fails  to  take  a  truly  philosophical  view  of  nature, 
may  confirm  himself  in  the  belief  that  nature  is  the 
cause  and  origin  of  all  things,  and  that  there  is  no 
God.  It  is  quite  otherwise,  however,  with  those 
who  are  truly  rational. 

Pragmatism        §  60.  There  is  another  criterion  of  truth  to  be 
considered — the  pragmatic.    This  is  the  appeal 


§  6o  J      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  105 

to  the  essential  goodness  of  truth.  To  the  Greek 
thinkers  it  seemed  natural  to  conclude  that  Good- 
ness, Truth  and  Beauty  are  essentially  one ;  but 
the  tendency  of  nineteenth-century  pessimistic 
philosophy  was  to  separate  these  elements  of 
fundamental  reality,  and  to  set  them  against  one 
another.  But  this  attitude  is  generally  associated 
with  that  spurious  realism  which  pbces  an  im- 
penetrable wall  between  our  ideas  and  reahty,  and 
renders  true  knowledge  impossible,  or,  at  least, 
renders  any  criterion  of  it  impossible.  Pragma- 
tism, which  regards  '*  true  **  as  connoting,  not  less 
than  **  good,*'  that  which  is  useful,  indicates  a 
tendency  towards  the  older,  and  I  think,  more 
valid,  point  of  view.  But  before  we  can  accept  the 
pragmatic  definition  of  truth  as  that  which  **works,*'  , 
we  must  first  settle  the  question  **  to  what  end  ^  ** 
Statements  which  serve  for  the  purposes  of  daily 
life,'  and  are,  therefore,  pragmatically  true,  will 
not  serve  for  the  purposes  of  more  exact  science,^ 
and  are,  therefore,  pragmatically  false.  Um- 
versality  here  appears  to  be  the  needed  criterion. 
The  statements  of  science  will  serve  for  the  pur- 
poses of  daily  life,  though  no  doubt  more  cumber- 
some, because  more  exact,  than  the  common  state- 
ments usually  employed  for  such  purposes.    But 

'  For  example,  the  statements  that  the  sun  rises,  that  water 
boils  at  212°  F.,  etc. 


io6     THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§6o 

these  latter  statements  are  valid  only  within  their 
own  sphere*  Hence  they  are  less  near  approxima- 
tions to  absolute  truth  than  are  the  statements  of 
science. 

The  need  for  defining  the  end  by  means  of  which 
truth  may  be  pragmatically  judged  is  the  more 
necessary  in  the  sphere  of  Ethics.  What  a  man 
considers  as  his  good,  may  involve  the  reverse  of 
good  to  the  rest  of  humanity.  Hence,  what  a  man 
might  pragmatically  judge  to  be  morally  true, 
might  for  the  rest  of  humanity  be,  again  prag- 
matically considered,  morally  false.  Here  again 
universality  seems  to  be  the  needed  criterion,  and  if 
we  define  the  good  of  an  individual  as  that  which 
ministers  to  the  happiness  of  the  whole  of  humanity, 
or  as  many  members  of  it  as  may  be  concerned, 
then  we  may,  I  think,  apply  the  pragmatic  criterion 
to  moral  truth. 

The  Unity  of  §61.  As  Swedenborg  so  well  teaches,  divine 
and  Tnith  ^ove  and  truth,  though  separable  in  thought,  make 
one  in  actuality,  as  do  their  most  adequate  symbols, 
the  heat  and  light  of  the  sun.  That  which  is 
really  true  is  good  ;  that  which  is  genuinely  good 
is  true.  Falsity  cannot  result  in  genuine  good, 
nor  truth  in  other  than  merely  temporary  (and 
therefore,  only  apparent)  evil. 
Truth  is  more  than  a  matter  of  mere  knowledge ; 


§  6i  ]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH         107 

it  is  something  to  be  lived,  not  merely  to  be  known. 
Truths  do  not  really  become  a  man's  until  he  makes 
them  part  and  parcel  of  his  very  being,  **  Faith 
without  works  is  dead/'  A  living  faith  is  the 
perception  of  truth  combined  with  a  life  lived  in 
accordance  with  its  dictates.  It  is  truth  in  the  will 
as  well  as  in  the  understanding.  If  a  man's  prin- 
ciples do  not  result  in  a  good — that  is,  a  genuinely 
altruistic — life,  then,  either  these  principles  are  not 
really  the  man's,  or  else  they  are  not  true.  Thus 
we  may  judge  of  the  truth  of  any  principle  :  if 
really  lived,  does  it  result  in  good  ^  Of  course, 
every  truth  cannot  be  judged  in  this  way,  but  only 
such  as  may  sufficiently  affect  a  man's  actions  for 
their  effects  to  be  observable.  Moreover,  in  using 
this  pragmatic  criterion  it  is,  of  course,  absolutely 
necessary  that  our  ideas  as  to  what  is  good,  and 
what  is  evil,  are  valid  :  no  standard  may  be  set  up 
which  involves  anything  of  self-love  as  an  end,  else 
truth  will  appear  erroneous  and  error  true. 

To  sum  up  :  man  has  the  power  of  seeing  truth 
when  presented  to  him  in  a  manner  harmonious 
with  his  stage  of  intellectual  development.  He  is 
taught  truth  largely  through  his  own  experience. 
He  may  avail  himself  of  the  experiences  of  others 
which  bear  a  relation  to  his  own  sufficiently  near 
for  him  to  perceive  it.  And,  further,  he  may  judge 
of  the  truth  of  principles  according  to  whether  they 


io8     THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§6i 

make  for  good  or  evil.  Thus,  all  truth  is  gained 
through  the  rational  interpretation  of  experience, 
which  is  revealed  by  God  and  discovered  by  man. 

Conclusion  §  62.  To  conclude  this  brief,  but  I  hope  not 
altogether  inadequate,  contribution  to  a  subject 
of  no  little  difficulty,  I  shall  quote  the  follow- 
ing beautiful  passage  from  Swedenborg.  It  has 
reference  to  the  state  of  those  beatified  souls  who 
are  termed  by  him  the  **  celestial  angels,**  and  who 
are  wholly  united  to  (though  not  absorbed  in)  God, 
in  virtue  of  a  perception  of  their  utter  dependency 
upon  Him  for  all  the  truth  that  they  know  and  the 
good  that  they  effect*  They  are  in  full  conscious 
possession  and  use  of  that  power  which  I  have 
termed  **  intuition  **  or  the  **  sight  of  the  soul,**  a 
power  which  bears  fruit  in  exact  proportion  to  the 
degree  of  divine  union  (or  moral  purification)  to 
which  the  soul  has  attained.  '*  Divine  truths,** 
says  Swedenborg,  **  appear,  as  it  were,  inscribed  on 
[the  celestial]  angels*  minds,  or  as  if  they  were  im- 
planted and  innate  in  them  ;  and  therefore  as  soon 
as  they  hear  genuine  Divine  truths  they  immedi- 
ately perceive,  acknowledge  and  afterwards  see 
them,  as  it  were,  within  themselves.  For  the 
angels  of  the  third  [i.e.,  celestial]  heaven  never 
reason  about  Divine  truths,  still  less  do  they  dis- 
pute about  the  genuineness  of  any  truth  ;  nor  do 


§62]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH  109 

they  know  what  it  is  to  believe  or  to  have  faith ; 
for  they  say,  *  What  is  faith  i  I  perceive  and  see 
that  the  fact  is  so/  They  illustrate  this  by  com- 
parisons ;  for  example,  it  would  be  as  if  any  one 
should  see  a  house  and  the  various  things  in  and 
around  it,  and  should  say  to  his  companion  that  he 
must  believe  that  these  things  exist,  and  that  they 
are  such  as  he  sees  them  to  be :  or  as  if  any  one 
should  see  a  garden  with  its  trees  and  fruit,  and 
should  say  to  his  companion  that  he  ought  to  have 
faith  that  there  is  a  garden,  and  that  there  are  trees 
and  fruit,  whereas  he  sees  them  plainly  with  his 
eyes.  Hence  it  is  that  those  angels  never  mention 
faith,  nor  have  they  any  idea  of  it ;  neither  do  they 
reason  about  Divine  truths,  still  less  dispute  con- 
cerning the  genuineness  of  any  truth.  But  the 
angels  of  the  first  or  lowest  heaven  have  not  Divine 
truths  thus  inscribed  on  their  minds,  because  with 
them  only  the  first  degree  of  life  is  open  ;  therefore 
they  reason  concerning  truths,  and  those  who 
reason  see  scarcely  anything  beyond  the  immediate 
object  about  which  they  reason,  or  travel  beyond 
the  subject,  except  to  confirm  it  in  certain  respects  ; 
and  when  they  have  confirmed  it,  they  say  it  is  a 
matter  of  faith,  and  that  it  ought  to  be  believed.  I 
have  spoken  with  angels  on  these  subjects  and  they 
told  me  that  the  distinction  between  the  wisdom  of 
the  angeb  of  the  third  heaven  and  that  of  the  angels 


no     THE  MAGIC  OF  EXPERIENCE  [§62 

of  the  first  heaven  is  like  that  between  what  is  clear 
and  what  is  obscure ♦  They  also  compared  the 
wisdom  of  the  angels  of  the  third  heaven  to  a 
magnificent  palace  full  of  all  kinds  of  useful  things, 
around  which  are  gardens  on  all  sides,  bordered 
by  magnificent  objects  of  many  kinds  ;  and  those 
angels,  since  they  are  in  the  truths  of  wisdom,  can 
enter  into  the  palace,  and  see  everything,  and  also 
walk  in  the  gardens  in  every  direction  and  take 
delight  in  every  thing.  But  it  is  different  with 
those  who  reason  concerning  truths,  and  especially 
with  those  who  dispute  about  them;  for  they 
do  not  see  truths  in  the  light  of  truth,  but  either 
accept  them  on  the  authority  of  others,  or  take 
them  from  the  literal  sense  of  the  Word,  which  they 
do  not  clearly  understand  ;  and  therefore,  having 
no  desire  to  possess  any  inward  perception  of  the 
truth,  they  say  that  truths  ought  to  be  believed  and 
that  faith  is  to  be  exercised  on  them.  Of  these,  the 
angels  said  that  they  cannot  approach  the  first 
threshold  of  the  palace  of  wisdom,  much  less  enter 
it  and  walk  about  in  its  gardens,  because  they  stop 
at  the  first  step.  It  is  different  with  those  who  are 
imbued  with  the  very  truths  themselves  ;  nothing 
retards  their  unlimited  progress,  because  truths 
which  are  seen  to  be  true  guide  them  wherever 
they  go,  and  lead  them  forth  into  wide  fields, 
since  every  truth  is  of   infinite    extent    and  is 


§62]      THE  NATURE  OF  TRUTH         iii 

in  close  connexion  with  a  multitude  of   other 
truths, 

**  They  said,  further,  that  the  wisdom  of  the 
angels  of  the  inmost  heaven  consists  principally  in 
this,  that  in  every  object  they  see  Divine  and 
heavenly  things,  and  in  a  series  of  several  objects 
they  see  still  more  wonderful  things,  for  everything 
they  see  has  a  correspondence  ♦  When  they  see 
palaces  and  gardens  their  view  is  not  arrested  by 
these  visible  objects  but  penetrates  to  the  interior 
truths  whose  outward  expression  they  are  and  to 
which  therefore  they  correspond ;  and  all  this 
takes  place  with  infinite  variety  according  to  the 
appearance  of  the  objects  ;  thus  they  obtain  a  com- 
prehensive view  of  innumerable  things  in  an 
orderly  connexion,  and  this  so  affects  their  minds 
that  they  seem  to  be  transported  with  delight/*  ® 
It  is  this  state  of  mind,  I  conceive,  to  which  the 
true  philosopher  ought  to  aspire. 

*  Emanuel  Swedenborg  :  Heaven  and  its  Wonders,  and  Hell, 
§270  (edition  in  Everyman*s  Library,  trans*  by  F.  Bayley). 
It  should  be  noted  that  Swedenborg  uses  the  word  **  reason  *' 
above  in  the  sense  of  mere  **  ratiocination,**  not  with  the  wider 
meaning  with  which  I  have  employed  it  in  this  book.  The 
three  heavens  of  which  he  speaks  are  not,  according  to  him, 
situated  in  space,  but  are  the  objectifications  of  different  states 
or  discrete  degrees  of  mind* 


THE  END 


Works  on  Philosophy  and  Science 


By  H.  STANLEY  REDGROVE 

B,Sc.{Lond.hF.CS, 

ON  THE  CALCULATION  OF  THERMO- CHEMICAL 
CONSTANTS. 

(Arnold,  1909.     6s.  net.) 

MATTER,  SPIRIT  AND  THE  COSMOS:  Some  Suggestions 
towards  a  better  Understanding  of  the  Whence  and 
Why  of  their  Existence. 

(Rider,  19 10.     2S.  6d.  net.) 

ALCHEMY:  ANCIENT  AND  MODERN.  Being  a  brief 
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Relations,  to  Mysticism  on  the  one  hand,  and  to 
recent  Discoveries  in  Physical  Science  on  the  other 
hand,  together  with  some  Particulars  regarding  the 
Lives  and  Teachings  of  the  most  noted  Alchemists. 

(Rider,  191 1.    4s.  6d.  net.) 
{American  Edition.     McKay.     $1.50.) 

A  MATHEMATICAL  THEORY  OF  SPIRIT.  Being  an 
Attempt  to  employ  certain  Mathematical  Principles 
in  the  Elucidation  of  some  Metaphysical  Problems. 

(Rider,  191 2.     2s.  6d.  net.) 

EXPERIMENTAL  MENSURATION:  an  Elementary  Text- 
Book  of  Inductive  Geometry. 

(Heinemann,  191 2.     2s.  6d.) 

THE  JOURNAL  OF  THE  ALCHEMICAL  SOCIETY.     Edited 
by  H.  Stanley  Redgrove,  B.Sc. 
(Lewis.     Vol.  I.,  191 3,  i2s.  net.     Vol.  II.,  1914,  i8s.  net. 
Vol.  III.,  in  progress,  2s.  net  per  part.) 


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